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The complexities of leadership in today’s environment are often obscured by the focus of 
traditional theories on leadership as the top-down, leader-subordinate construct typical of 
hierarchical organizations. These theories also do not fully capture what occurs when 
leaders must catalyze action well above and beyond their formal lines of decision making 
and control. Leaders today must simultaneously lead “down” in the traditional sense, 
“up” to influence the people or organizations to which they are accountable, and “across” 
to activate peer groups and others with whom there is no formal subordinate relationship, 
and that these activities are parts of an integrated whole. This leadership model is referred 
to as “meta-leadership.”  
This thesis asked, to what extent is Governor Haley Barbour’s response to and 
decision making during Hurricane Katrina an example of meta-leadership? What can be 
learned as far as smart practices from Barbour’s leadership and can these practices be 
replicated?  The focus of this thesis was the conduct of a single case study. Governor 
Haley Barbour’s leadership style and decision-making process during Hurricane Katrina 
response operations were examined to determine whether or to what extent they accord 
with the theory of meta-leadership. Our conclusions are that Governor Barbour 
epitomized the tenets of meta-leadership and that, given the proper academic 
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PREFACE 
In April 2005, I returned from a year in Baghdad and was appointed the Director 
of Military Support for the Mississippi National Guard. I was responsible for the 
planning, coordinating and deploying of National Guard troops in support of a 
gubernatorial call-out in Mississippi. These call-outs include terrorist events, natural 
disasters, and man-made disasters.  
Over the course of the next six years, Mississippi was struck by numerous 
disasters. Hurricane Katrina, an Enhanced Fujita (EF) 4 tornado in 2010, Deep Water 
Horizon Oil Spill throughout the summer of 2010, two EF-5 tornados in 2011, and the 
Mississippi River Flood in summer 2011 still represent some of the most significant 
disasters to hit our nation. In each of these disasters, the Mississippi National Guard was 
activated to assist first responders in response, relief, and recovery efforts. As a 
guardsman, I had the opportunity to work for and observe the leadership of Mississippi 
Governor Haley R. Barbour. Governor Barbour rose to the challenges of each of these 
monumental catastrophes with leadership, intelligence, and confidence—the qualities 
needed to govern in times of crisis. As I began my journey to choose a topic for my 
thesis, I continually returned to the leadership acumen of the governor. I realized that 
there have been few examinations of leadership traits in elected officials during 
catastrophic disasters. In today’s political environment, voters tend to elect politicians 
based on their party’s platform or on the charisma of the leader. How many times have 
leaders been elected based on their well-defined leadership skills, especially in situations 
that were catastrophic in nature? When an event happens, the electorate and media expect 
the leader impacted by the event will know exactly how to react, develop a response plan, 
and lead the response plan.  
Hurricane Katrina was the worst natural disaster in terms of economic impact to 
ever strike the United States. To many Americans, Hurricane Katrina marks a low point 
in disaster response and recovery. Few have ever spoken about the many positive 
outcomes in the aftermath of a disaster that killed 1,833 Americans and caused over 
$108 billion in damages, roughly four times the damage wrought by Hurricane Andrew.  
xvii 
Hurricane Katrina struck in the early morning hours of August 29. For the next 
two months, I worked alongside thousands of National Guardsmen, active duty Soldiers, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials, police officers, fire fighters, 
and everyday Americans responding to the greatest natural disaster in terms of economic 
impact in our nation’s history. The entire Gulf Coast was destroyed. Over 60,000 homes 
in the southern part of the state were destroyed, and 238 Mississippians perished in the 
storm.  
Given the horrible conditions during the response and recovery phases, the 
leadership displayed by Governor Haley Barbour served as an example of what a leader 
must do during a catastrophic event. His actions and decisions in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina clearly needed to be studied. However, this study needed to be more 
than simply a biography of a leader. Governor Barbour’s leadership style needed to be 
examined to determine if his methods can be taught.  
There are dissenters who say that Governor Barbour’s actions and decisions 
during the response to Hurricane Katrina were politically motivated, and he was 
determined to help the wealthy at the expense of low-income residents. His decision to 
allocate over $400 million to rebuilding the Port of Gulfport drew particular scrutiny.1 
Opponents to this decision believed that the funding should have been directed to the 
construction of low-income housing and other programs to assist the poor. However, 
almost a decade after the storm, the Mississippi Gulf Coast has emerged more 
economically sound, with a greater population, higher student test scores, and a rebuilt 
infrastructure. Governor Barbour’s vision and experience as a seasoned politician clearly 
led to more good than bad decisions.  
As I began the research for this project, I discovered the theory of meta-
leadership. Meta-leaders are leaders whose scope of thinking, influence, and 
accomplishment extend far beyond their formal or expected bounds of authority. This 
leadership theory was developed by Harvard professors Leonard Marcus, Isaac 
1 Spencer S. Hsu, “Mississippi Groups Sue HUD, Objecting to Use of Katrina Aid for Port,” 
Washington Post, December 11, 2008, accessed November 03, 2014, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-
19622992.html?refid=easy_hf 
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Ashkenazi, Barry Dorn, and Joseph Henderson, who built it from elements of existing 
leadership models.2  
As I read their work, I realized that this version of leadership nested with the 
leadership traits of Governor Barbour during the response and recovery phases of 
Hurricane Katrina. Since Marcus et al.’s concept of leadership lacked a case study that 
would epitomize their theory, I decided to develop a thesis using case study 
methodologies to the leadership theory known as meta-leadership. This is a single case 
study that examines the decisions made by Governor Barbour during Hurricane Katrina. 
The process to develop this case study was through direct interviews with the governor 
and from researching various articles, journals, government publications, and books about 







2 Leonard J. Marcus, Barry C. Dorn, and Joseph M. Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-
Leadership,” in National Preparedness Initiative, Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government at 
Harvard University, 2008), http://npli.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2013/04/Meta-
leadership-Distribution.pdf, 1.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The complexities of leadership in today’s environment are often obscured by the 
focus of traditional theories on leadership as the top-down, leader-subordinate construct 
typical of hierarchical organizations. During the course of their research, Marcus et al. 
found that approximately 85 percent of the existing leadership literature assumed a 
hierarchical leadership structure.1 Additionally, the authors discovered that many 
leadership theories dealt with a single level of process because it is difficult to develop 
multi-level theory. A single level process does not integrate all disciplines of response 
operations or the behavior of individuals, groups or organizations as a whole. Multi-level 
reality, they posit, is what many leaders face. The traditional boss-to-employee 
relationship has been formalized in clear roles, authority structure, rules, job descriptions, 
and responsibilities that prescribe performance and productivity expectations. Many 
relationships that are critical to leadership success, though, are not so structured. Theories 
of matrix organizations look at cross-functional relationships but generally within a single 
organization. All of these are valuable, but none is sufficient to explain the multiplicity of 
challenges that a leader faces today.  
The events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) are examples of the multiplicity of 
challenges that serve as a catalyst for new standards in leadership in disaster response. 
Both New York and at the Pentagon, 9/11 represented a complex environment of terrorist 
actions, massive fires, and total collapse of structures never imagined to fail. Responders 
were forced to deal with the threat of continued attacks, large scale loss of life, and the 
complete collapse of the Twin Towers. Up until this event, no American responder or 
leadership network had ever been so challenged since the U.S. was attacked on December 
7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor. The silo effect of distinct cultures, budgets, and narrowly 
focused mission requirements compel many government agencies toward self-
protectiveness, insularity, and allegiance to their own agency-based advocacy and 
1 Ibid., 3. 
1 
                                                 
independence. In the post-9/11 and post-Katrina environments, there needs to be new 
leadership paradigms that compel leaders to work in a collaborative, common manner to 
succeed at the strategic level. New leadership paradigms must include a common mission 
and intent and the embrace of core values such as unity of mission that coalesces all 
stakeholders. 
These theories also do not fully capture what occurs when leaders must catalyze 
action well above and beyond their formal lines of decision making and control. Marcus 
et al. argue that the best evidence of effective leadership in these situations is unified 
action among all stakeholders toward a common goal, which they call “connectivity.”2 
To achieve this, they argue that leaders today must simultaneously lead “down” in the 
traditional sense, “up” to influence the people or organizations to which they are 
accountable, and “across” to activate peer groups and others with whom there is no 
formal subordinate relationship, and that these activities are parts of an integrated whole. 
They describe such broadly envisioned, overarching leadership as “meta-leadership.” 
Meta-leadership addresses leadership challenges that cross inter- as well as intra-
organizational boundaries.3  
The meta-leadership model was developed observing and analyzing the actions of 
leaders in unprecedented crisis situations—post-9/11, post-Anthrax scare, post-Katrina, 
and other crises—as well as the preparation for the next-generation of such emergencies. 
Marcus et al. have worked in educational settings with more than 225 senior U.S. 
government leaders and tracked the impact of this work over a five-year period. As the 
principles of meta-leadership were applied in a variety of situations, the observations are 
presented as qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. Marcus et al. developed a theory 
of leadership based on guiding principles of what makes for a good leader in a 
catastrophic or complex incident. However, Marcus et al. conducted no research that 
focused on one leader during one event. Rather, they put together a conglomeration of 
leadership traits using the “best of the best” traits among many leaders and many different 
2 Leonard J. Marcus, Barry C. Dorn, and Joseph M. Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National 
Emergency Preparedness: A Model to Build Government Connectivity,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 
Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 4, no. 2 (2006): 129, doi:10.1089/bsp.2006.4.128.  
3 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 3. 
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events. This composite model does not define whether or not a single leader can in fact be 
a meta-leader who exhibits each of the five tenets of meta-leadership during a single, 
catastrophic event.  
According to the special report of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs’ report Hurricane Katrina, A Nation Still Unprepared, there four 
overarching government failures that led to prolonged suffering of the population 
impacted by the storm and the slow recovery: 
1. Long-term warnings went unheeded and government officials neglected 
their duties to prepare for a forewarned catastrophe; 
2. Government officials took insufficient actions or made poor decisions in 
the days immediately before and after landfall; 
3. Systems on which officials relied on to support their response efforts 
failed; and 
4. Government officials at all levels failed to provide effective leadership.4 
This 700-page document focuses the majority of its poor leadership examples on 
Louisiana in general and on the New Orleans metropolitan area specifically or on the 
federal government’s mistakes. Few references are made to the leadership in Mississippi, 
from the local levels to the state level. Because there is little mention of Mississippi 
leadership decisions in any government publications, this thesis examined the Governor 
Barbour’s leadership and his key decisions in the days, weeks, months, and years after 
Hurricane Katrina. His leadership decisions were then examined through the lens of 
meta-leadership in order to determine if he fit the definition of a meta-leader.  
Marcus et al.’s concept of meta-leadership pertains to leadership in a complex, 
catastrophic event. Hurricane Katrina was an extraordinary act of nature. It was the most 
destructive natural disaster in American history in terms of economic loss, laying waste 
to 90,000 square miles of land, an area the size of the United Kingdom.5 In Mississippi, 
the storm surge obliterated coastal communities. In addition, New Orleans was 
overwhelmed by flooding. All told, more than 1,500 people died. Clearly, Hurricane 
4 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared: Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate S. Doc. No. 109–322 (2006), 2.  
5 Ibid., 1. 
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Katrina represented a complex catastrophe and serves as an excellent case study for meta-
leadership. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
To what extent is Governor Haley Barbour’s response to and decision making 
during Hurricane Katrina an example of meta-leadership? What can we learn as far as 
smart practices from Barbour’s leadership? If Governor Barbour’s leadership style 
closely mirrors the theory of meta-leadership, can this model serve as a roadmap for other 
leaders in a crisis situation?  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The focus of this thesis was the conduct of a single case study. Governor Haley 
Barbour’s leadership style and decision-making process during Hurricane Katrina 
response operations were examined to determine whether or to what extent they accord 
with the theory of meta-leadership. Governor Barbour was interviewed to gain his 
personal insights into his response to the disaster and his thoughts during the response 
and recovery phases. The case study model follows a qualitative construct. The 
governor’s actions and decisions were applied to the five tenets of meta-leadership: 1) the 
person 2) the situation 3) lead the silo 4) lead up 5) lead connectivity.6 The intent was to 
validate the theory of meta-leadership and provide an analysis of the response, recovery, 
and rebuilding through a case study. Using one case study does not necessarily validate 
or disprove a theory. There are an immeasurable number of factors of both the leader and 
the situation that influence the outcome of an event. However, an examination of one 
person’s decisions during the course of one event can magnify critical factors that come 
into play in determining success or failure. Therefore, by providing a foundation to study 
the actions of one person in one event can serve as the foundation for future studies to 
validate the theory of meta-leadership. This is a novel approach in that most case studies 
develop theories through case studies. The theory of meta-leadership has already been 
developed. This thesis tests the work of Marcus et al.  
6 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness,” 129. 
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D. SELECTION CRITERIA RATIONALE 
Current leadership models include thousands of examples of leadership and the 
styles, actions, and training that are attributed to the leader. However, an examination of 
those styles illustrates one overarching theme: leadership styles are for the most part 
hierarchal and do not cross the traditional boundaries between organizations. With the 
advent of outsourcing business functions, real-time supply chain management, whole-of-
government constructs and real-time information flow, the traditional notions of 
hierarchal leadership require modifications to keep pace with changing technology and 
governance structures. In other words, today’s environment requires a new, innovative 
leadership style that allows modern leaders to function in a volatile, uncertain, complex, 
and ambiguous environment. Furthermore, the majority of leadership styles available to 
be studied are more leadership traits than a methodology or model to utilize to ensure 
success during a catastrophic occurrence. Meta-leadership is a complete model and 
theory for leading in a complicated, uncertain, and ambiguous environment. This thesis 
will examine many of the challenges Governor Barbour encountered during Hurricane 
Katrina and how he overcame them. His actions and decisions will be examined through 
the lens of meta-leadership to illustrate how his leadership traits fit the tenets of meta-
leadership as defined by Marcus et.al.7  
I chose to examine Governor Barbour and his response during Katrina because of 
my personal experiences with him during Katrina. As I researched dozens of leadership 
models, meta-leadership seemed the most compelling model to apply to the governor’s 
actions. I examined other disasters in recent history, from the events of September 11, 
2001, to the anthrax crisis, to the Boston Marathon bombings. Hurricane Katrina was 
clearly the most catastrophic and the one I had the most knowledge of. I looked at various 
leaders, from Rudolph Giuliani to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
Administrator Craig Fugate, to Fire Department of New York (FDNY) Battalion Chief 
Joseph Pfeifer. While leaders in their own rights, Governor Barbour provided the most 
comprehensive example of leadership during a large-scale catastrophe. Last, because of 
7 Ibid. 
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my previous encounters with Governor Barbour, I was granted access to him for the 
purpose of studying his decisions during Katrina.   
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I conducted a methodical review of literature surrounding the decision-making 
and leadership models for modern, complex catastrophes. My review focused on 
determining if there is a practical model for leadership that transcends the normal 
boundaries of single organizations and hierarchal “leader-to-lead” dynamics. Through the 
research, I discovered the theory of meta-leadership. This relatively new and innovative 
theory differs from many models on leadership in that this model promotes cross-
organizational collaboration and thinking outside the hierarchal boundaries of a single 
organization. With this model in mind, I conducted research to see if the leadership of 
Governor Barbour during Hurricane Katrina could be applied to the meta-leadership 
theory. I examined historical accounts of the storm to determine if there were sound 
decisions made that expedited Mississippi’s response to and recovery from the most 
economically devastating hurricane to strike the United States. Finally, I conducted 
research on the life and career of Governor Haley R. Barbour to determine if he fit the 
definition of a meta-leader.  
F. LEADERSHIP 
The leadership style required to accelerate the move from a complex, chaotic 
environment to one that is manageable is referred to as meta-leadership.8 Meta-leaders 
require a distinct mindset, unique leadership acumen, and the ability to create a network 
that transcends agencies.9 Meta-leadership refers to guidance, direction, and momentum 
across organizational lines that develop into a shared course of action and a commonality 
of purpose among numerous agencies. There are five dimensions of meta-leadership 
practice and analysis that serve as an organizing framework for classifying the foci of 
leadership study. These dimensions are: 1) the person of the leader and his awareness or 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ronald N. Ashkenas, The Boundaryless Organization: Breaking the Chains of Organizational 
Structure (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995), 14. 
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problem assessment; 2) the situation, problem, change, or crisis that compels response; 3) 
leading one’s entity and/or operating in one’s designated purview of authority; 4) leading 
up to bosses or those to whom one is accountable; and 5) leading cross-system 
connectivity.10 Meta-leadership is especially valuable in events when many different 
organizations and entities must be brought together for common purposes.  
Often, the complexities of leadership are obscured by the inclination to view 
leadership as a top-down process of leader leading follower. The boss-to-employee 
relationship is formalized in clear roles, rules, job descriptions, and responsibilities with 
prescribed performance and productivity expectations.11 However, this leadership 
technique does not capture what occurs when leaders in bureaucratic organizations seek 
to influence and activate change well above and beyond established lines of their 
decision-making authority and control. They are driven by a purpose broader than that 
prescribed by their formal roles, and they are motivated and capable of acting in ways 
that transcend usual organizational confines.  
The meta-leader model was developed to account for the special skills needed by 
leaders in an emergency preparedness and response environment. Marcus et al. do discuss 
the issue of connectivity and how leadership activities across organizations must always 
be effective;12 however, there is no research that backs this up. In addition, they do not 
address the evolving impact of social networks and how they affect relationships, which 
are important issues.  
The meta-leader model does not weigh any tenet more than others. The person of 
the meta-leader must be the linchpin of the model. An ineffective leader or one that does 
not fit the model thereby negates the rest of the tenets. Experience, maturity, and 
emotional intelligence are a must in the meta-leadership model.  
The meta-leadership activities referenced in all readings address short-term fixes 
rather that long-term system changes. Relationships change depending on the activities 
10 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 12.   
11 John W. Gardner, On Leadership (New York: Free Press, 1990), 102. 
12 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness,” 130. 
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upon which that the relationship is built. Leaders for transformational change may not be 
the same participants in a short-term emergency situation. In addition, the long-term 
utility of the meta-leadership model is its adaptability to other than emergency situations, 
such as catastrophic events that take months or years to fully recover from. A long-term, 
transformation relationship may require different leadership techniques than those of a 
short duration.  
Collaboration must be real in order to affect change. Additionally, it must be 
based on the realization that leaders do not leave their agendas behind when they 
collaborate and negotiate. Leaders use each other’s agenda to come up with realistic 
solutions to problems and policies that reflect all parties’ agendas and values. 
Collaboration allows us to turn ideas into actions. Furthermore, importance of leaders 
being linchpins within their organizations cannot be overemphasized. Meta-leaders also 
need to be linchpins in that they need to move their partners to new levels and non-
traditional approaches to the transformation of programs and policies.13  
Finally, the situation tenet of meta-leadership is well-defined, but there is no study 
on how imperative it is that the meta-leader fully comprehends the situation in such a 
way as to immediately devise a solution. Even an experienced leader can misinterpret the 
situation, which can lead to an object failure to execute a response plan. 
According to Welsh scholar David Snowden, there are four phases of a response 
to a large-scale event: chaos, complex, complicated, and simple. Dr. Snowden defines 
these phases as the Cynefin framework.14 This term describes a perspective on the 
evolutionary nature of complex systems, including their inherent uncertainty. Cynefin is a 
Welsh word that means “habitat or place.” The name serves as a reminder that all 
interactions are strongly influenced and frequently determined by our experiences, both 
through the direct influence of personal experience, as well as through collective 
experience.15 
13 Ibid. 
14 David J. Snowden, and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review 85 (November 2007): 67. 
15 Ibid., 68. 
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Snowden’s best description of chaos is “where complex systems go in order to 
solve a complex task.”16 By this, he means that the only way to resolve chaos is to work 
through the initial problems of an event by using adaptive and innovative leadership 
skills acquired through experience and from innate intelligence. In essence, he is saying 
that true leaders in emergency response obtain their skills through both nature and 
nurture. One of the most critical requirements is the need for responders to work to make 
sense out of a situation in those first few critical moments.17 Weick’s book, Making 
Sense of the Organization, details the definition of sensemaking and how he developed 
applicable models for business problems, strategic planning concepts, and for the world 
of first responders making life and death decisions. He provided superlative examples of 
how responders, when faced with life-threatening decisions, either succeeded or failed 
based on their ability to make sense of a situation and apply the proper techniques and 
guidance in a very short span. In addition, Weick theorizes that sensemaking is 
essentially making sense out of a situation that initially makes no sense and a situation 
that known methods will not provide applicable resolutions because the situation is new 
and untested. It is important to explore how the meta-leadership model dovetails into the 
Weick’s and Simon’s18 theories of sensemaking. Personal leadership development 
activities also impact effectiveness of the meta-leadership partnerships.  
Leaders are both made and born.19 People must have key traits to lead before they 
can be a leader. They must take charge of themselves and commit to learning both the art 
and science of leading.20 Giuliani and Kurson talk about these individual traits but never 
acknowledge the bigger picture of the organization over the individual.21 Conversely, 
Burns shifted the focus of leadership studies from the traits and actions of great men to 
the interaction of leaders and their constituencies as collaborators working toward mutual 
16 Ibid., 67. 
17 Karl E. Weick, Making Sense of the Organization (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 122. 
18 Herbert A. Simon, “Invariants of Human Behavior,” Annual Review of Psychology 41, no. 1 (1990): 
4, doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.41.020190.000245. 
19 Rudolph W. Giuliani, and Ken Kurson, Leadership (New York: Hyperion, 2002), 17. 
20 Ibid., 23. 
21 Ibid., 27 
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benefit.22 This creates a true paradox of leadership models. Can they be mutually 
exclusive?  
One key aspect of being a leader is the ability to sense quickly of a grave 
situation. Successful leaders are capable of making rational, effective decisions quickly 
without complete information. Simon refers to this as “satisficing” or making the 
required, rational decision that maximizes the opportunity to respond in such a manner as 
to move the situation from chaos to complex.23  
Ashkenas’s work on creating an organization that has minimal hierarchies and has 
middle management working across the spectrum of the organization presents a twist to 
new leadership models. Ashkensas devotes a great portion of his works to advocating for 
reduced boundaries in corporations, restructuring to meet the needs of the current global 
marketplace. Because of the radical changes in supply chain management in which 
multiple organizations are responsible for a product’s delivery to the customers, 
Ashkensas states that companies should mimic the supply chain model in that no one 
particular directorate or section should be responsible for a product.24 Essentially, the 
premise is to break down the “stovepipes” when a company is restructuring.25 Written for 
the people who will actually be in charge of the change, this is a handbook on how, not 
why, to create a corporate structure that mimics the borderless global marketplace. The 
strategy outlined is difficult to follow and to understand how a company in the midst of 
downsizing could ever implement the changes advocated in the book. New corporations 
could feasibly organize in the manner described by Ashkensas.  
Boin’s work on leaders’ responsibilities during a disaster fits well with meta-
leadership. Boin states that in times of crisis, communities and members of organizations 
expect their leaders to minimize the impact of the crisis at hand.26 Boin goes on to 
22 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 17. 
23 Simon, “Invariants of Human Behavior,” 4. 
24 Ashkenas, The Boundaryless Organization, 17. 
25 Ibid., 44. 
26 Arjen Boin, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6. 
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describe how critics, the media, and bureaucratic competitors try to seize the moment to 
blame incumbent rulers and their policies for all missteps taken in a catastrophic event.27 
In an extreme environment, policy makers must somehow establish a sense of normality 
and foster collective learning from the crisis experience. This comprehensive analysis 
examines how leaders deal with the strategic challenges and political risks they face. 
Boin’s work explains what is expected of leaders but he never ties in the “how” with the 
“what.” This was the first piece of literature I read on leadership during a crisis, and it is 
what motivated me to write a thesis on leadership and what led me to meta-leadership as 
a model for elected officials to utilize during high-stress events.  
According to Nicholls, Burns used the term “transforming leadership” to describe 
a type of non-coercive political leadership that engaged people, was morally elevating 
and, in turn, sparked leadership in them.28 When applying this concept to organizations, 
however, Nicholls noted that there was a tendency by upper level managers to broaden 
the meaning of transforming in such a way that it obscured its original intent.29 Burns 
viewed transforming leadership from the non-coercive influence on the individuals’ 
perspective: people were transformed by becoming “engaged” and this, in turn, could 
produce a transformation in the organization.30 As it happens, however, a transformation 
can also be produced by leadership from the opposite perspective, namely what Nicholls 
referred to as a power-wielding “shaker-and-mover.”31 A successful autocrat can 
transform the fortunes of an organization but is far from Burns’s concept of a 
transforming leader. In this article, Burns suggests this confusion can be clarified by 
realizing that the transformation produced by the shaker-and-mover comes from success 
in performing the macro-leadership role of culture-building. True transformational 
leadership in organizations only occurs when the “visioning” of meta-leadership is 
27 Ibid., 16. 
28 John Nicholls, “Meta Leadership in Organisations: Applying Burns’s Political Concept in 
Transforming Leadership,” Leadership & Organization Development Journal 9, no. 2 (1988): 17, 
doi:10.1108/eb053633. 17–22  
29 Ibid., 18. 
30 Ibid., 20  
31 Boin, The Politics of Crisis Management, 18.  
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applied to performance of the leadership role. In this way, enthusiastic followers are 
created as people become “engaged,” doubts are removed and energy is released. 
Nicholls looked at the concept of leadership from the perspective of consensus building 
and not through authoritative power that comes with a position. Additionally, Nicholls 
highlighted the differences between the shaker and mover and a visionary leader. 
However, he seemed intent on stating that these leadership styles were “either/or” and 
that these traits could not be resident in one single leader.32  
Schein offered a definition of what he called organizational culture as a pattern of 
shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid, 
and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and 
feel in relation to those problems.33 The definition applies to organizations of virtually 
every kind: families, social clubs, work groups, companies, governments, and nations.34 
Over time, each such group develops a set of tacit and explicit understandings, beliefs, 
and practices. 
Furthermore, Schein states that values guide decision making and activity at all 
levels in the organization.35 The focus and management style of senior officers is values-
based. Much can be learned about the culture of an organization by looking at such things as 
its routine processes, how are decisions made, how much responsibility is given to each staff 
member in the organization, and how flexible the organization is in dealing with tasks that 
are out of the ordinary. When these things are put together, a distinctive organizational 
“personality” becomes apparent even to casual observers.36  
Schein’s philosophy ties in well with meta-leadership, especially in the person of 
the meta-leader tenet. Organizational culture has a powerful effect on the way an 
32 Ibid., 22. 
33 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 
1985), 19. 
34 Ibid., 22. 
35 Ibid., 65. 
36 Ibid., 67. 
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organization operates and on the way the employees think about themselves, their 
superiors, and the mission of the organization. In addition, Schein made some mentions 
of sub-cultures within organizations but did not elaborate.37 Within every organization 
are sub-cultures, some good and some not. Schein should have elaborated more on how 
these sub-cultures can be counterproductive and how productive leaders could mitigate 
contrarian sub-cultures.  
G. HURRICANE KATRINA  
At 5 pm on Friday, August 26, 2005, the National Weather Service in Slidell, 
Louisiana (LA), predicted that Hurricane Katrina would make landfall in Burras, LA, as a 
Category 4 hurricane sometime Monday morning, August 29, 2005.38 These predictions 
proved true, and the storm made its first landfall at 6:10 am with sustained winds at  
121 mph, a Category 3. The storm was unusually large at 400 miles across with an eye 
measuring 30 miles.39 For a historical perspective, Hurricane Camille, which struck 
Mississippi in 1969, had an eye of only 10 miles.40 Two hours later, the storm made its 
second landfall in Hancock County, Mississippi (MS). Katrina was the third-strongest 
storm in history to make landfall in the United States. It killed 1836 people, including 
238 in Mississippi. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration predicted a 
storm surge of 18 to 22 feet. An unmanned buoy 64 nautical miles off of Dauphin Island, 
Alabama (AL), measured a wave 57.4 feet, marking it as the largest wave ever recorded 
from a tropical cyclone.41  
Hurricane Katrina left in its wake a path of destruction that covered almost 90,000 
square miles.42 The storm remained a Category 1 as it passed through Jackson, MS, 169 
37 Ibid., 68. 
38 A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Report 000–000) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2006), 561.  
39 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 51. 
40 James Patterson Smith, Hurricane Katrina: The Mississippi Story (Jackson, MS: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2012), 21. 
41 Ibid., 22. 
42 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 51. 
13 
                                                 
miles from the coast. The economic impact of the storm was over $200 billion, marking it 
as the costliest storm in the nation’s history.43 In scientific terms, Hurricane Katrina’s 
total energy, according to Ivor van Heerden, Louisiana State University’s Hurricane 
Center Director, was more than 100,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima.44 Smith’s book, Hurricane Katrina: The Mississippi Story, is an excellent 
account of the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Smith provides 
oral histories and other primary sources and tells the dramatic story of a people who 
confronted unprecedented devastation.  
In addition, Smith discusses the life and death accounts from August 29, 2005, 
and the issues of a lack of food and water that followed. Told from a grassroots 
perspective, the narrative offers insights into the politics of recovery funding and the 
bureaucratic missteps that hampered the storm response and complicated and delayed the 
work of recovery. Smith did an excellent job of describing the damage, the horrible 
conditions after the storm and the excellent response by the coastal residents in their 
rebuilding efforts. However, he did not examine any of the strategic-level decisions and 
merely blamed the politicians and federal responders for everything that residents 
perceived to be wrong.45  
On September 15, 2005, the House of Representatives approved H.R. 437, which 
created the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response 
to Hurricane Katrina. By February 15, 2006, it was to report its findings regarding the 
development, coordination, and execution by local, state, and federal authorities of 
emergency response plans and other activities in preparation for Hurricane Katrina. Next, 
the committee was tasked to report its findings on the local, state, and federal government 
response to Hurricane Katrina. Chaired by Representative Tom Davis (R-VA), the 
committee issued A Failure of Initiative as its final report.46  
43 A Failure of Initiative: Final Report. 
44 Smith, Hurricane Katrina: The Mississippi Story, 56. 
45 Ibid., 58.  
46 A Failure of Initiative: Final Report, iii. 
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The results of the House Select Committee hearings and research confirmed the 
news accounts about the failure of all three levels of government to meet their obligations 
to the public.47 In its report, the committee characterized the response to Katrina as “a 
litany of mistakes, misjudgments, lapses, and absurdities all cascading together, blinding 
us to what was coming and hobbling any collective effort to respond.”48 The committee 
stressed that the Katrina failures were primarily the result of a lack of performance, not a 
lack of plans.49 The response described in the report was not a failure of public policy but 
a failure of policy implementation. As often happens in governmental investigations, the 
entire focus seemed to be more about finding someone to blame rather than an in-depth 
examination of why things went wrong. As has been repeatedly stated, Katrina was an 
unprecedented storm. There was no failure of initiative; the failure was in imagination. 
Leaders and emergency managers across the spectrum from local to federal failed to 
imagine that a storm could create that much devastation over such a wide expanse. Even 
if the leaders had imagined such a storm, would the government (local, state and federal) 
ever have allocated the kind of funding to mitigate the effects of such a storm?  
H. GOVERNOR BARBOUR 
The literature available on Governor Barbour was a mix of public relations 
releases, interviews with the governor, and editorials that either vilified him or presented 
him as the twenty-first century Ronald Reagan. Outside of the strictest of biographical 
sketches, I struggled to find a good biography of Governor Barbour. The majority of my 
findings were from the Mississippi Department of Archives in the form of newspaper 
articles.  
I. REVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
The following chapters will provide a roadmap that ties in meta-leadership with 
Governor Barbour’s actions during Hurricane Katrina. Chapter II outlines the five tenets 
47 Ibid., 66. 
48 Ibid., 5. 
49 Ibid., 33. 
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of meta-leadership as defined by Marcus et al.50 Chapter III details of Hurricane 
Katrina’s impact on the state of Mississippi will be described. Chapter IV describes 
Governor Barbour’s actions, decisions, and thoughts in the aftermath of the storm. 
Chapter V provides an analysis of the governor’s actions as they pertain to meta-
leadership in order to determine whether or not Governor Barbour’s actions fit the mold 
of meta-leadership. Finally, Chapter VI ties the thesis together and analyses the validity 




50 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness,” 128. 
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II. META-LEADERSHIP 
Successful leaders are capable of projecting their scope of thinking, influence, and 
accomplishment far beyond formal or expected bounds of authority. In the same vein as 
“meta-research” seeks systematic themes across many lines of study, “meta-leaders” 
generate widespread and cohesive action and impact that expands their domain of 
influence and leverage.51 There are five dimensions of meta-leadership practice and 
analysis that serve as an organizing framework for classifying the foci of leadership 
study. These dimensions are: 1) the person of the leader and his awareness or problem 
assessment; 2) the problem, change, or crisis that compels response; 3) leading one’s 
entity and/or operating in one’s designated purview of authority; 4) leading up to bosses 
or those to whom one is accountable; and 5) leading cross-system connectivity.52 Meta-
leadership is especially valuable in events when many different organizations and entities 
must be brought together for common purposes (see Figure 1).  
51 Ibid., 1. 
52 Ibid., 2. 
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Figure 1.  Meta-Leadership Model53 
Often, the complexities of leadership are obscured by the inclination to view 
leadership as a top-down process of leader leading follower. The boss-to-employee 
relationship is formalized in clear roles, rules, job descriptions, and responsibilities with 
prescribed performance and productivity expectations.54 However, this leadership 
technique does not capture what occurs when leaders in bureaucratic organizations seek 
to influence and activate change well above and beyond established lines of their 
decision-making authority and control. They are driven by a purpose broader than that 
prescribed by their formal roles, and are motivated and capable of acting in ways that 
transcend usual organizational confines. This is described by Marcus et al. as meta-
leadership.55  
Meta-leaders seek to achieve results that cannot be accomplished by one 
organization, unit, or department alone. Their objective is often a “social good.” They 
strive for improved community preparedness and national security, better health care and 
patient safety, or higher corporate productivity.56 These broad objectives appeal to and 
53 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 4. 
54 Gardner, On Leadership, 102. 
55 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 12. 
56 Ibid., 13. 
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require participation by people who work in the full spectrum of occupations, from 
public, private to community-based levels of a structured hierarchical framework. By 
linking the efforts of these many people and many otherwise disconnected organizational 
units, the meta-leaders leverage and integrate their activities to accomplish something 
that would not otherwise be achievable.57 There is value in both the outcome and in the 
process, in other words, the “impact value” and the “collaborative value.” 
Meta-leaders inspire others with their capacity to articulate and achieve linkages 
and outcomes. They strive for more than just personal gain or parochial organizational 
promotion. Additionally, meta-leaders make the case that by acting and interacting above, 
beyond, and across the confines of their own bureaucratic entities, the overall enterprise 
will accomplish more, and therefore the work for people involved will be more fulfilling 
and satisfying. Meta-leaders coalesce the knowledge, organizational workings, and frame 
of reference to achieve an otherwise unachievable cohesion of effort.58 When effectively 
practiced, the vision and aptitude portrayed by the meta-leader compel others to follow. 
By design, meta-leadership concept and practice themes address the complexities 
of generating a unity of action when many different people, organizational units and even 
competing priorities are focused into a broadly adopted strategy, plan, or mission.59 In 
concept, it is a question of best linking solution to problem: what personal and contextual 
factors affect what meta-leaders see, perceive, decide and ultimately act upon? In 
practice, it is a puzzle of optimally engaging three facets—up, down, and across—of 
organizational connectivity. Who are the many people that must be influenced, and how 
can they best be leveraged to prompt forward motion? The meta-leadership model 
described here focuses attention and helps categorize the scope of people, factors, and 
considerations that are in the purview of this integrated enterprise.60 
57 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 67. 
58 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 18. 
59 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness,” 131. 
60 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 5. 
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A. THE PERSON OF THE META-LEADER  
Personality, experience, culture, emotional expression, and character are 
significant factors in the conduct and impact of meta-leaders.61 These qualities vary 
significantly from leader to leader. However, there are common traits in meta-leaders that 
define them as leaders. Meta-leaders tend to be “big thinkers.” They are willing to take a 
large and complex problem and search a wide expanse for solutions.62 In addition, they 
have abundant curiosity and prolific imagination to contemplate and activate that which 
has not been otherwise discovered. Moreover, they are imaginative strategists, charting a 
course that allows stakeholders to operationally link and leverage one another in order to 
accomplish shared objectives. And most importantly, they have a penchant and capacity 
for making meaningful things happen.63  
Additionally, meta-leaders also possess emotional intelligence.64 People who 
direct large scale or complex initiatives must convey these attributes: self-awareness, 
self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills. Because they are watched and 
challenged by audiences beyond their usual social circles, meta-leaders must be 
comfortable in their own surroundings, in the milieu of others. Furthermore, they must 
have the talent to make other people feel comfortable and assured. The self-discipline, 
drive, understanding, and capacity to form meaningful and satisfying relationships are 
critical in the effort to cross the usual divides and boundaries of organizational, 
professional, and cultural association.65  
It takes great stamina during high stress circumstances to effectively lead 
organizations. Meta-leaders constantly rely on the practiced procedures, protocols, or 
patterns of past experiences that trigger constructive activity and actions. The meta-
leaders, by virtue of emotional intelligence and experience, have the perspective to chart 
61 Alan Kirschenbaum, Chaos Organization and Disaster Management (New York: Marcel Dekker, 
2004), 27. 
62 Giuliani, and Kurson, Leadership, 34. 
63 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 7. 
64 Burns, Leadership, 17. 
65 Ibid., 34. 
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the possibilities and prompt action across their organization. Through disciplined self-
awareness, they are able to manage the magnitude of their stress, and with that, rapidly 
recover the composure required to guide others systematically up from the “basement.”66 
Having accomplished that and with constructive action in place, the meta-leaders are then 
able to raise themselves to the highest order of thinking, to the cortex or “new brain,” to 
formulate strategic links and leverages that guide and direct people beyond the crisis.67 
Meta-leaders have the experience and maturity to identify gaps between the problem and 
the response to it and then to inspire the connectivity of action and confidence of purpose 
under even the most trying of circumstances. This aptitude for the strategic direction and 
capacity to influence beyond his immediate domain epitomizes the unique contributions 
of meta-leaders.  
B. THE SITUATION  
Finding the most appropriate solution to a problem or response to a crisis depends 
first on precisely determining what is occurring.68 This is a difficult task because there is 
often a gap between objective reality and subjective assessment. This is more likely to 
occur when many different people and organizational units are involved, when a great 
deal of information is required to diagnose the problem, when the stakes and emotions 
are high, and when the analysis and action are time constrained. In other words, the 
greater the complexity, the more difficult it is to develop a factual, evidence-based, clear, 
and actionable description of what is occurring.69 Truly understanding the entire situation 
is the most important aspect of meta-leadership. Without an accurate sense of the size, 
scope, and complexity of the situation, leaders cannot make effective decisions. 
66 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 7. 
67 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness,” 129.  
68 John Bransford, and Barry S. Stein, The Ideal Problem Solver: A Guide for Improving Thinking, 
Learning, and Creativity (New York, NY: W.H. Freeman, 1984), 32. 
69 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 129. 
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To understand the complexities of the situation is to grasp the disparities between 
what one believes to be true and the actual truth.70 This is a particularly compelling 
problem in the midst of an unfolding crisis. In a volatile and quickly changing scenario, 
the gap is inevitable, since it takes time for information to emerge and assessments to 
evolve. In practice, this requires the meta-leaders to grasp, to work with, and to narrow 
that likely reality-belief gap, aided by the collection of further information, the passage of 
time and the perspective of hindsight. Such complex circumstances demand the capacities 
and skills for strategic situational awareness.71  
Situational awareness and the ability to identify and thus close gaps in 
information are key traits of meta-leaders. In a complex situation, the many stakeholders 
involved naturally each have their own analysis and interpretation of the “objective 
problem” in accordance with their distinct interests, concerns, and purposes.72 In looking 
for ways by which those differences could complement rather than contradict one 
another, meta-leaders link, leverage, and integrate different perspectives into a value-
added prospect, in effect closing the gaps and building connectivity among those 
disparate views.73 With that, the differences are less likely to serve as detractors. 
Potential discord is transformed into an opportunity for acquiring broad perspective. At 
times, this analysis requires identification of confusing cross-cutting themes, priorities, 
and considerations in order to derive the most accurate “picture” of the problem or event 
that is unfolding. Meta-leaders recognize that the size of the gap will shift as time and 
events unfold.74 In practice, during a high casualty disaster, the anticipation of additional 
and more accurate information and the expectation that the situation will remain fluid for 
some time does not relieve the meta-leader of responsibility. Rather, it puts even more 
pressure to take action before all the facts are in place and the crisis has subsided. Meta-
leaders must make sense of the situation without having complete information. 
70 Joan Marques, “Awakened Leadership in Action: A Comparison of Three Exceptional Business 
Leaders,” Journal of Management Development 27, no. 8 (2008): 813, doi:10.1108/02621710810895640.  
71 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness,” 129.  
72 Nicholls, “Meta Leadership in Organisations,” 18. 
73 Ibid., 22. 
74 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 17. 
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Sensemaking is paramount to effective action in the midst of a crisis. Meta-leaders cannot 
suffer from “paralysis by analysis.” A quick assessment that is mostly accurate is better 
than a slow, thorough one that that comes too late to make a difference.75  
Effective meta-leadership closes the gap between what is objectively happening 
and what is perceived to be in progress. Meta-leaders possess accurate situational 
awareness and problem assessment under stressful circumstances. Often, in the vacuum 
of information, there are myths and false information that can lead to a great deviation 
from the plan. Rumors, inaccurate reporting, and exaggeration can mislead a leader and 
cause him to devote time and valuable resources going in the wrong direction. Meta-
leaders must distinguish between what is important from what is less so. They must 
identify what are cohesive priorities from those that are not. Finally, they must gather the 
confidence and courage to make decisions and take action based on calculated 
speculation and risk. Meta-leaders understand those risks, recognizing that any decision 
or action could impose differential perils and downsides for each of the different 
stakeholders. Meta-leaders also calculate the upsides of those decisions and actions, again 
understanding that “success” will be measured differently by each stakeholder who is 
affected.76  
Often, in the absence of meta-leadership, pragmatic situational awareness and 
problem assessment suffer when the leader is distracted or simply misconstrues what is 
occurring. This gap between perception and reality has its own dangers.77 There are 
numerous reasons why this happens and why it happens often. It could be a function of a 
parochial point of view or the leaders are caught by a strong case of denial prompted by a 
multitude of personal or professional explanations. They are seeing the expected or the 
desired outcomes and missing the information or clues that do not correspond. This could 
be from a lack of experience necessary to identify and understand what is happening. 
Some leaders demand to have all the information before making a decision, and in the 
process, cause a delay that further exacerbates the original problem. At times, leaders are 
75 Weick, Making Sense of the Organization, 53. 
76 Nicholls, “Meta Leadership in Organisations,” 19 
77 Ibid., 20. 
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overloaded by information, much of it low quality and distracting, which becomes 
difficult if not impossible to use and decipher as important facts become lost in a mass of 
data. Functionally, these conditions lead to ineffective problem solving by leaders. 
Further, they are incapable of gaining and maintaining situational awareness. Ineffective 
leaders often focus on solving the easy or convenient problems rather than the problems 
that truly need solving.  
C. LEAD THE SILO  
In complex environments involving multiple organizations, departments, and 
units operating in overlapping domains, leaders who arise as meta-leaders rarely operate 
independently. They have their own organizational base of operations within which 
followers see them in charge.78 In this instance, the leaders carry authority; have 
resources at their disposal and functions within a set of rules and roles that define 
expectations and requirements. Those subordinates expect adherence to allegiances and 
loyalties, trusting that the leaders will advocate on behalf of their best interests.  
For meta-leaders, the support of their constituents is essential to achieving 
influence within the larger system. It is imperative that, in order to get people outside of 
the organization to follow meta-leaders, that their own people recognize them as the 
leader who is looking out for them and their organization’s best interests. A potential 
quandary is in treading that fine line between advocating on behalf of the larger system 
mission and meeting expectations of his subordinates. There are a number of elements 
required to make this happen. Meta-leaders must articulate and personify the shared 
mission in a way that respects the identity of each individual constituency while not 
negating that of their own. And there must be demonstrated commitment to constituents 
if they are to get that same commitment in return.79 Leaders must operate on the premise 
that their success is directly tied to the success of their subordinates. If a commitment or 
objective is to be generated and championed in many directions and for shared purposes, 
it must first emanate from the meta-leaders’ internal, immediate core group. Meta-leaders 
78 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 12. 
79 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness,” 133. 
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are expressively committed to their followers and thus generate that same commitment in 
response.80 
The meta-leader is a “leader of leaders” and fosters leadership development 
throughout the system, though first among their own constituents. Leadership does not 
reside with one person. In robust organizations, it is embedded among many people and 
at multiple levels of the hierarchy.81 Moreover, effective leadership is a continuous 
learning process. Meta-leaders must constantly encourage subordinates to learn, grow, 
and have vision. These goals must continuously be modified as the situation dictates. 
Meta-leaders must foster proactive thinking, and they must inspire their subordinates to 
become overachievers. To do this requires a sense of leadership confidence and security. 
Furthermore, meta-leaders must acknowledge that strong, smart, capable followers are 
not threats to their careers but rather vital assets committed to common goals and 
objectives. Meta-leaders seek high achieving people who are essentially meta-leaders in 
training. In other words, meta-leaders seek empowered people who share the passion, 
commitment, instinct, and capacity to get things done.82  
Guiding and directing behavior from atop the hierarchy, the meta-leaders 
recognize that a collaborative, attuned strategy among senior leadership sets the tone for 
the organization to succeed. Even in the most successful organizations, there will be 
problems, differences, and conflicts. The issue is whether those differences are readily 
resolved or conversely played out as policy and procedural contests that put lower 
ranking personnel at cross-purposes. Meta-leaders understand the way relations at the 
highest levels affect operations at the lowest level. They use this understanding in a 
positive and proactive manner to enhance morale and shared purpose throughout the 
organization.83 
The unity of effort and reliability of achievement that meta-leaders inspire 
throughout their domain of responsibility is the foundation for work beyond the direct 
80 Nicholls, “Meta Leadership in Organisations,” 21. 
81 Giuliani, and Kurson, Leadership, 56. 
82 Nicholls, “Meta Leadership in Organisations,” 22. 
83 Giuliani, and Kurson, Leadership, 56. 
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confines of official authority and power. The confidence, direction, and dependability 
fostered within serve as the exemplification for what is communicated to the larger 
system of influence and action, especially in a large crisis situation.  
D. LEAD UP 
Most people who work in organizations have a boss. The chief executive officer 
(CEO) of a publicly traded corporation has the board of directors. Below the CEO are a 
series of subordinates who serve as boss to their staffs. Government agencies have strict 
supervisory oversight. And even the president, a governor, or mayor must be accountable 
to their electorates. As a result, our culture has in both its public and private domains a 
complex system of checks, balances, and oversights to limit autonomy and autocracy.84  
Being able to effectively influence the boss is an important element of wider 
leadership within the system. In government, as well as in corporate settings, subject 
matter experts often report to elected or appointed authorities who are responsible for 
policy direction and strategic decision making. While subordinates may not know more 
than their boss, they often have a perspective on the work at hand that their boss does not. 
Because they are in closer proximity to that work, subordinates have a better sense for 
both real problems on the ground as well as solutions to address them. This perspective 
and functional interdependence could be a valuable asset to the boss, though much 
depends on how the information is delivered and how it is received.85 
The great meta-leaders are a great subordinate. They are dependable, honest, 
reliable, and loyal. They validate the power and command equation, respecting, and 
serving the objectives of those in charge. In this way, the meta-leaders craft vertical 
connectivity and fosters two-way feedback. Influence is shaped by informing and 
educating the boss. Bosses of course vary in style and temperament, and the meta-leaders 
appreciate that as with any relationship, this relationship is one that must be carefully and 
strategically managed.86 When this works well, the boss appreciates the prioritization and 
84 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 17. 
85 Ibid., 18. 
86 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness,” 133. 
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management of problems and decisions. The focus is on the truly important issues or 
goals that are worthy of the boss’s time. This drastically reduces distractions and 
inefficiencies. In shaping that focus, meta-leaders intentionally and transparently 
communicates information and a variety of reasonable options in order to craft strategic 
assessment and solution building. The successful subordinates manage assumptions, do 
not promise what cannot be delivered, and assure that the boss is never surprised. While 
bad news and valid criticism are hard to deliver, the meta-leaders practice “truth to 
power.” They anticipate and manage the dangers and distractions of unforeseen 
problems. Successful meta-leaders give the boss possible solutions when delivering 
problems. They do not leave the boss wondering how to solve unforeseen issues.  
It would be difficult if not impossible to be a meta-leader without the concurrence 
and support of the boss. Since one function of the boss is to reign in and curb abuses of 
power, a boss with an overly active subordinate meta-leader may not only stop these 
activities but also find them threatening to the point of dismissal. An unsympathetic boss 
could limit the would-be meta-leader’s access to outside people. Worthwhile ideas and 
proposals could be marginalized. Obstacles and barriers could be imposed that would 
undermine the cause and purposes of the meta-leader. Good meta-leaders recognize these 
pitfalls and generally does not remain in organizations led by poor or unethical leaders.87 
In a successful organization, the meta-leaders are able to fashion wide influence 
throughout the system by virtue of the support and opportunities the boss is able to open. 
This does present a quandary of who gets the credit and subsequent reward. There are 
some bosses who welcome and encourage subordinates with valuable ideas and strategies 
and who endorse meta-leaders’ larger presence in the system of influence and impact. 
That independence and those accomplishments are viewed by such a boss as a testament 
both to subordinates’ talents and motivations as well as his or her own. Other bosses 
prefer to claim sole credit for those ideas and strategies in order to enhance their 
recognition and status on the larger scene. As appropriate to the situation, meta-leaders 
may very well conclude it best to allow the boss to take the recognition if it advances the 
87 Burns, Leadership, 17. 
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larger purposes.88 Meta-leaders recognize that they can guide the direction of an 
organization or system through numerous vantage points.  
E. LEAD CONNECTIVITY  
In building a wide sphere of influence, meta-leaders grasp that just as vertical 
linkages are important, so too are horizontal linkages. By leveraging the capacity of many 
adjacent centers of expertise and capacity, meta-leaders are able to engage the spectrum 
of agencies and private interests that are to be recruited to a shared enterprise.89 This is 
the value-added of meta-leaders. The ability to generate a common, multi-dimensional 
thread of interests and involvement among entities that look at a problem from very 
different yet complementary vantage points is a defining trait of meta-leaders. By 
combining assets and efforts, meta-leaders envision and activate more than what any one 
entity could do on its own.  
The ability to lead connectivity is important and very difficult. Often, wide social 
problems and questions demand the engagement of a wide set of constituencies. These 
different groups and entities will not, on their own, recognize the lines of influence and 
capacity that they could generate together. In fact, they might very well see themselves in 
competition with one another. If credit or benefit falls to one entity more than another, 
the noble purposes can be undermined by those who question “what’s in it for me?” 
Meta-leaders are able to focus attention on the shared purposes while at the same time 
tempering those forces of suspicion and jealousy that constrain their achievement.90  
Meta-leaders keenly identify and understand the individual motives of different 
stakeholders and constituencies in generating a connectivity of thinking and action. The 
job is to align these disparate but complementary spheres into a unified plan of action. 
Each entity must be recognized for its unique profile of interests, experiences, and 
contributions to the shared enterprise.91 While it is common for people to focus on the 
88 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 20. 
89 Ashkenas, The Boundaryless Organization, 65. 
90 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness,” 133. 
91 Ibid., 133. 
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differences and conflicts among them, the meta-leader turns the attention to points of 
agreement. Meta-leaders enable the various entities to focus on shared values, aspirations, 
objectives, and circumstances. With a new appreciation for their points of commonality, 
stakeholders are able to creatively envision what they could accomplish if they were to 
join forces, building new equations, and strategies of common ground and achievement.  
Push-back and resistance are to be expected in fashioning this new alignment of 
strategy and action.92 Bureaucratic entities characteristically reward internally focused 
leadership that simply builds the budget, authority, and autonomy of their own endeavors. 
The introduction of collaboration may require some traditionally competitive 
constituencies to turn away from well-entrenched attitudes about and behaviors toward 
one another. If such push-back and resistance is anticipated and planned for, it is far less 
likely to undermine the shared purposes. Meta-leaders craft an alternate reward structure, 
through which stakeholders are acknowledged and encouraged for their work in building 
shared solutions. The compelling message, which is the theme of their meta-leadership 
work, should speak to what can be accomplished if these traditional rivalries can be 
replaced by the advantages of the shared enterprise.93  
Cohesion of action cannot begin in the moment of decision and action. It must be 
embedded into the thinking and activity of agencies and people, a purpose and mission 
upheld by meta-leaders. For this reason, designing cross-system connectivity of action is 
a strategic and methodological building endeavor, by which both the process and 
outcome of the effort attest to the value and benefits of working toward common 
purposes. As stakeholders experience the advantages of leveraging the knowledge, 
resources, and expertise of others, they recognize the benefit and added influence gained 
when their contributions are likewise leveraged by others. The efforts and connectivity 
generated by meta-leaders build a momentum of its own and impact and collaborative 
value both arise and thrive. Meta-leaders recognize that to keep the connected effort on 
92 Boas Shamir, and Jane M. Howell, “Organizational and Contextual Influences on the Emergence 
and Effectiveness of Charismatic Leadership,” The Leadership Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1999): 262, 
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track, it must be carefully monitored and adjusted so that it remains current with new 
developments and demands.94 
F. CONCLUSION 
Meta-leadership can be translated into five dimensions of practice: 1) the person 
of the leader and his awareness or problem assessment; 2) the problem, change, or crisis 
that compels response; 3) leading one’s entity and/or operating in one’s designated 
purview of authority; 4) leading up to bosses or those to whom one is accountable; and 5) 
leading cross-system connectivity.95 Meta-leaders operate along these five domains of 
action, leveraging each dimension of thinking and practice as the situation or event 
dictates. Furthermore, the meta-leaders are constantly analyzing the situation and 
modifying their perspective in order to constantly integrate all resources seamlessly and 
in a timely manner. 
 
94 Nicholls, “Meta Leadership in Organisations,” 21. 
95 Ibid., 6. 
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III. HURRICANE KATRINA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2005 hurricane season was an exceptional year. Three of the six most intense 
Atlantic hurricanes ever documented occurred: Hurricane Wilma (ranked first), Hurricane 
Rita (fourth), and Hurricane Katrina (seventh).96 However, Hurricane Katrina was the 
deadliest and most destructive that year. To this day, Katrina is the costliest natural 
disaster and the third deadliest hurricane in the history of the United States. With over 
1,836 fatalities from the hurricane and subsequent floods, Katrina killed more people than 
any other storm since the 1928 Okeechobee hurricane. Total property damage is 
estimated at $108 billion, roughly four times the damage from Hurricane Andrew in 
1992.97  
When Hurricane Katrina made landfall near the Louisiana-Mississippi border on 
the morning of August 29, 2005, she exposed millions of Americans to extraordinary 
hardship. Katrina was the nation’s “perfect storm” in that it devastated rural areas, urban 
centers, environmentally sensitive wetlands, timber and farmland, and impacted virtually 
every socio-economic group in the nation. Hurricane Katrina carved a swath of physical 
destruction, environmental devastation, and human suffering through Mississippi, 
Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, Tennessee, Ohio, and Kentucky. The storm killed 
Americans in eight states.98  
B. FORMATION AND IMPACT 
Hurricane Katrina developed initially as Tropical Depression #12 in the 
southeastern Bahamas on August 23. This tropical depression strengthened into Tropical 
Storm Katrina the next day. It then moved slowly along a northwesterly then westerly 
96 Ron Mctaggart-Cowan et al., “Hurricane Katrina (2005). Part I: Complex Life Cycle of an Intense 
Tropical Cyclone,” Monthly Weather Review 135, no. 12 (2007): 3905, doi:10.1175/2007MWR1875.1. 
97 Smith, Hurricane Katrina: The Mississippi Story, 17. 
98 John S. Petterson, “A Preliminary Assessment of Social and Economic Impacts Associated with 




                                                 
track through the Bahamas, increasing in strength during this time. A few hours before 
landfall in south Florida (FL) at around 6:30 EDT on August 25, Katrina strengthened to 
become a Category 1 hurricane. Landfall occurred between Hallandale Beach and North 
Miami Beach, Florida with wind speeds of approximately 80 mph. Gusts of above 90 
mph were measured as Katrina came ashore.99 As the storm moved southwest across the 
tip of the Florida peninsula, Katrina’s winds decreased slightly. The storm caused two 
deaths and moderate damage to a state still recovering from the devastating 2004 
hurricane season in which the Florida peninsula endured an unprecedented four 
hurricanes. After spending only seven hours over land, Katrina quickly re-intensified 
shortly after moving into the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico and regained hurricane 
strength. 
Katrina moved almost due westward after entering the Gulf of Mexico. A mid-
level ridge centered over Texas weakened and moved westward allowing Katrina to 
gradually turn to the northwest and then north over the days that followed. Atmospheric 
and sea-surface conditions were conducive to the cyclone’s rapid intensification, which 
lead to Katrina attaining “major hurricane” status on the afternoon of the August 26. The 
storm continued to strengthen and move northward during the next 48 hours. Katrina 
became a Category 5 storm Sunday morning, August 28 with maximum wind speeds of 
over 170 mph. Its minimum central pressure dropped that afternoon to 902 mb—the 
fourth lowest on record for an Atlantic storm.100 Although Katrina, at its peak strength 
was comparable to Camille’s intensity, it was a significantly larger storm and impacted a 
broader area of the Gulf Coast. 
Hurricane Katrina’s winds and storm surge reached the Mississippi coastline on 
the afternoon of August 28, 2005. The storm subsequently cut a path of destruction 
through central Mississippi over the next two days. Hurricane-force winds reached 
coastal Mississippi by 2 a.m. and the eye of the storm made landfall in Mississippi at 10 
99 David M. Simpson et al., “Understanding Critical Infrastructure Failure: Examining the Experience 
of Biloxi and Gulfport, Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina,” International Journal of Critical 
Infrastructures 6, no. 3 (2010): 247, doi:10.1504/IJCIS.2010.033339.  
100 Ibid., 12. 
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a.m. Central Daylight Time (CDT) on August 29, 2005 in Pearlington, MS.101 The 
storm’s powerful right front quadrant covered coastal Mississippi and southern Alabama. 
Katrina passed over Bay St. Louis as a Category 3 hurricane with winds over 120 mph 
and a devastating storm surge that entirely leveled some beachfront neighborhoods. 
Flooding occurred as far north as Interstate 10. Katrina was still a Category 1 storm when 
it impacted Jackson, the state capital almost 170 miles inland. All 82 counties in 
Mississippi were declared disaster areas, 49 of which received full federal assistance.102 
Katrina was finally downgraded to a tropical storm at 7 p.m. that night over 200 miles 
from the ocean. Katrina remained a tropical storm until it passed into Tennessee late on 
the August 29.103  
The storm lasted over 17 hours, spawned 11 tornadoes, and produced a 32-foot 
storm surge that reached six to 12 miles inland. In addition, 55-foot sea waves pushed 
casino barges, boats, and debris into towns and left 238 people dead, 67 missing, and an 
estimated $125 billion in damages.104 Residents who refused to evacuate survived the 32-
foot storm surge by climbing into the second-floor attics or knocking out walls and 
ceiling boards to climb onto the roof or nearby trees. Over 100 people were rescued from 
rooftops and trees in Mississippi during the height of the storm. 
C. DEVASTATING SURGE 
Katrina’s storm surge was the most extensive, as well as the highest, in the 
documented history of the United States.105 Large portions of Hancock County, Harrison 
County, and Jackson County, Mississippi’s three coastal counties were inundated by the 
storm surge with flood inundation of almost 70 percent of the land mass, affecting most 
of the populated areas. Surge covered almost the entire lower half of Hancock County, 
destroying the coastal communities of Pearlington, Clermont Harbor, and Waveland and 
much of Bay St. Louis. The surge flowed up the Jourdan River, flooding the town of 
101 Smith, Hurricane Katrina: The Mississippi Story, 36. 
102 A Failure of Initiative: Final Report, 76. 
103 Smith, Hurricane Katrina: The Mississippi Story, 31. 
104 Ibid., 36. 
105 Ibid., 42. 
33 
                                                 
Kiln. In Harrison County, Pass Christian was completely inundated, along with a narrow 
strip of land to the east along the coast, which includes the cities of Long Beach and 
Gulfport. The flooding was more extensive in communities such as D’ Iberville, which 
borders the Back Bay of Biloxi. Biloxi, on a peninsula between the Back Bay and the 
coast was hard hit, especially the low-lying Point Cadet area. 
In Jackson County, storm surge flowed up the Singing River, a wide river estuary, 
with the combined surge and freshwater floods cutting the county in half. Over 90 
percent of Pascagoula, the easternmost coastal city in Mississippi, was flooded from 
surge. Other Jackson County communities such as Porteaux Bay and Gulf Shores were 
destroyed, and St. Martin was hard hit, along with Ocean Springs, Moss Point, Gautier, 
and Escatawpa. 
Waves destroyed many historic buildings that had withstood previous storms, 
including Hurricane Camille. The surge gutted homes and buildings up to the third floor. 
In addition, the storm destroyed or damaged beyond repair almost 64,000 homes in the 
six lower counties and destroyed or severely damaged over 104,000 homes throughout 
the state.106  
Katrina’s storm surge was a sustained, continuously growing high tide that kept 
building for hours. And when the water did recede back into the Gulf, it took everything 
with it—furniture, houses, automobiles, boats and countless hazardous household items. 
“Even the very accurate forecasts didn’t capture the magnitude and devastation,” said 
Eddie Favre, Mayor of Bay St. Louis. “It was the in and out of the surge that killed us. It 
carried everything away.”107 “Our infrastructure was devastated,” Gulfport Mayor Brent 
Warr said. According to A Failure of Initiative,  
The water came in, blew off manhole covers, then receded and caused a 
vacuum, sucking gators and DVD players and lots and lots of sand into 
water and sewer pipes. You couldn’t have backed a truck up to a manhole 
cover and dumped it in more effectively.108 
106 Simpson et al., “Understanding Critical Infrastructure Failure,” 255.  
107 A Failure of Initiative: Final Report, 133. 
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The mayor of Biloxi, A. J. Holloway, told the Biloxi Sun Herald, “This is our 
tsunami.”109 Many historic buildings were destroyed in Mississippi, including the 
cottages and second-story porches around the Beauvoir mansion, home of Jefferson 
Davis. Hundreds of irreplaceable Civil War-era artifacts from the Jefferson Davis home 
and museum were either lost or destroyed. In addition, the lower three floors of many 
high-rise casinos and hotels were gutted. Along with countless others affected by the 
hurricane, U.S. senator Trent Lott lost his Pascagoula home, and the boyhood home of 
Green Bay Packers quarterback Brett Favre was also totally destroyed. U.S. House 
Representative Gene Taylor, whose home was destroyed, recalls seeing complete and 
utter devastation on the ground and a telling sight in the air. “Birds were so tired all they 
could do was hold their wings out and soar on the wind,” he said. “Our seagulls, if I had 
to guess, ended up in Arkansas.”110 
Several casinos, which were floated on barges to comply with Mississippi land-
based gambling laws, were washed hundreds of yards inland by waves. A number of 
streets and bridges were washed away, including two bridge sections of U.S. Highway 
90. Those two bridges connected the three coastal counties in the cities of Biloxi and 
Ocean Springs and the cities of Pass Christian and Bay St. Louis. With this destruction 
came great challenges in moving between the three coastal counties;111 only Interstate 10 
was left to connect the counties.  
More than one million people in Mississippi were affected by the storm, and 
almost six months later, the extent of the loss in Mississippi was still described as 
“staggering” in USA Today on February 16, 2006:  
The Mississippi Gulf Coast has been devastated. The extent of the 
devastation in Mississippi is also staggering. Since Katrina hit, more than 
half a million people in Mississippi have applied for assistance from 
FEMA. In a state of just 2.9 million residents, that means more than one in 
109 Holbrook Mohr, “Katrina’s Full Wrath Still Being Felt as Body Count Rises along U.S. Gulf 
Coast,” AP Worldstream, August 31, 2005, accessed August 17, 2014, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-
112655800.html?refid=easy_hf 
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111 William L. Waugh, “Economic Development and Reconstruction on the Gulf after Katrina,” 
Economic Development Quarterly 20, no. 3 (2006): 12, doi:10.1177/0891242406289287  211–218 
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six Mississippians have sought help. More than 97,000 people are still 
living in FEMA trailers and mobile homes. Another 5,000 to 6,000 are 
still waiting for FEMA trailers. Almost six months later, many 
neighborhoods are still piled high with storm debris.112 
D. ECONOMIC IMPACT 
The economic impact to Mississippi was enormous. Agricultural, forestry, 
gaming, and poultry industries were severely damaged. Of the 2,678 businesses located 
in the areas flooded by Katrina’s storm surge, 1,827 received moderate to catastrophic 
damage resulting in 20,551 lost jobs.113 An additional 27,000 manufacturing workers lost 
their jobs to lay-offs while the plants were repaired, and in Gulfport, MS, over 28,000 
jobs were lost.114 In total, Mississippi’s unemployment rate spike by 2.2 percent in 
September 2005, with non-farm payrolls reduced by almost 30,000.115 The exact impact 
to the job market is difficult to estimate because so many Mississippians took temporary 
jobs in the recovery operations immediately after the storm. 
Forest products account for a large portion of Mississippi’s economic base. 
Timber lands cover over 19.6 million acres in the state. Mississippi produced over $1.1 
billion in forest products annually prior to August 2005.116 In the aftermath of Katrina, 
over nine million acres of timber land was heavily damaged or destroyed. This equates to 
over 12 billion board feet of timber lost with a total cost of lost timber estimated at $474 
million.117 Additionally, clearing damaged timber land and replanting cost over $45 
million.118   
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The Mississippi Gulf Coast was home to 69 seafood processing plants valued at 
$101.3 million; all 69 plants were destroyed. Additionally, the seafood industry in 
Mississippi generated annual revenues of $123.7 million. Moreover, Mississippi had 351 
registered shrimp boats prior to Katrina that harvested over $23 million in shrimp, and all 
but a few of the boats were destroyed by the storm. Furthermore, the environmental 
impact to the Mississippi Sound precluded any shrimp harvesting for over six months 
after the storm. 
Agriculture in Mississippi was decimated by Katrina. Over 87 percent of the 
state’s corn crop, 50 percent of the rice production, and over 100,000 bales of cotton were 
destroyed by Katrina with a market value of over $108 million.119 In addition, crops as 
far north as the Mississippi Delta were damaged or destroyed by tropical force winds and 
heavy rains.  
Second only to the timber industry in Mississippi is poultry production. Katrina 
killed 6.2 million birds valued at over $15 million. Additionally, the storm destroyed 
2,400 poultry barns with a replacement cost of over $6 million. Cattle were also affected 
by the storm. Mississippi’s livestock impact was over 10,000 head of cattle killed or 
displaced with a market value of $8 million.120  
The Mississippi Gulf Coast had 13 casinos when Hurricane Katrina struck.121 
Each of these casinos was water-borne to comply with Mississippi gaming laws. The 
storm surge and high winds tore every barge from its moorings and completely destroyed 
the coast’s gaming industry. The casino industry was the foundation of Mississippi’s 
$2.87 billion annual tourism industry. Moreover, the daily losses to the tourism industry 
after Katrina were $7.7 million. The casinos generated $500,000 per day in tax revenue to 
the state, which was 10 percent of the state’s tax revenues.122  
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In 2005, the Port of Gulfport was the third busiest container port in the Gulf of 
Mexico. The port had 2,058 permanent direct maritime jobs and handled 2.4 million short 
tons of commodities. Additionally, 96 percent of the commerce was foreign-based with 
bananas accounting for 30 percent of the tonnage. The Port of Gulfport’s electrical power 
supply, roads, water, sewer, rail, small craft harbor, navigational aids, and lighting were 
all destroyed by Katrina. Furthermore, approximately 430,000 square feet of warehouses 
and freezer facilities were destroyed.123  
In addition, Katrina destroyed 27 percent of major roads and nine percent of all 
rail lines in Mississippi.124 The cost of disruption to the coast’s intermodal transportation 
systems amounted to over $1 million per day with a total cost of $473 million.125  
Perhaps the most devastating impact of Katrina was to the housing infrastructure. 
Mississippi had over 220,384 homes impacted by the storm with almost 104,000 severely 
damaged or destroyed.126 After the storm, FEMA delivered 48,000 FEMA trailers for the 
displaced residents throughout the region.127  
Hurricane Katrina wrecked property and lives. The effects of the devastation will 
last for generations. However, in Mississippi, the people on the coast and throughout the 
state immediately began the monumental task of cleaning up. After almost a decade of 
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IV. CASE STUDY—GOVERNOR BARBOUR—LEADERSHIP 
DURING HURRICANE KATRINA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Haley R. Barbou’s election as governor of Mississippi in 2003 marked the largest 
voter turnout in Mississippi gubernatorial history, and he was reelected in 2007 with 58.2 
percent of the vote.128 The Yazoo City, Mississippi native is the second governor since 
Reconstruction to be elected to a second consecutive term as Mississippi’s chief 
executive. As Mississippi’s sixty-third governor, his strategic goals focused on civil 
justice reform, controlling spending, prudent management of the state health care 
program, and new attention on Mississippi as an energy producing state that can help 
meet America’s energy needs in the future. His team generated numerous large economic 
projects in the energy, aerospace, and automotive fields, including the selection by 
Toyota for Blue Springs, MS, as its newest U.S. auto assembly plant. In Barbour’s eight 
years as governor, per capita income in the state increased by 34 percent.129  
B. THE PLAN 
As a governor, as a national party chairman and political director for the White 
House, Governor Barbour recognized that a leader’s job is to put together a good team 
and empower them to act independently of their leader but collaboratively among 
themselves. Barbour made excellent choices for his cabinet. Ranging from his Executive 
Director of the Emergency Management Agency to his National Guard’s Adjutant 
General to his Commissioner of Public Safety, Barbour selected leaders with extensive 
credentials and proven records of success rather than focusing on the appointment of 
cabinet members whose loyalty was valued over competence and honesty. Barbour’s 
guidance to his cabinet early on in his term was, “If you think you know what to do, do it. 
Don’t come ask me when you think you know what to do. If you think you know what to 
128 Sid Salter, “Sunday Morning with Haley Reeves Barbour,” Clarion-Ledger (Jackson, MS), 
November 1, 2004. 
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do, do it. And if you screw up, we’ll clean up.”130 In addition, Governor Barbour 
believed in delegating both responsibility and authority. He led his administration by 
providing vision and guidance and then allowing his subordinates to develop strategies 
within their organizations.  
Mississippi had two “dress rehearsals” in preparation for its response to Hurricane 
Katrina. In September 2004, Hurricane Ivan, a deadly Category 3 storm, made landfall in 
Pensacola, FL. Initial projections forecast the storm to make landfall along the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast. These predictions caused the largest evacuation of the coast since 
Hurricane Frederic in 1979.131 In July 2005, Hurricane Dennis made landfall in Gulf 
Shores, AL. The predicted path of this Category 4 storm included the Mississippi coast. 
Again, Mississippians took this storm seriously and evacuations were ordered in Jackson 
and Harrison Counties. Hurricane Dennis made a dramatic move to the east only hours 
before landfall and struck Santa Rosa Island, FL as a Category 3 storm. These near 
misses provided Governor Barbour and his cabinet members an opportunity to refine 
their plans. Additionally, the preparations for these two storms allowed the Mississippi 
Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) leadership to begin to build a rapport with 
their Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) counterparts.  
Hurricanes Ivan and Dennis provided Governor Barbour some experience in 
leading during disaster situations. He convened press conferences in advance of both 
storms to urge self-preparedness and self-preservation. Barbour learned himself from the 
preparations needed in advance of the two previous storms. He stated:  
As you get later into the disaster, you go from preparation to executing. I 
will say good leaders learn, and this was a great learning experience for 
me: the single most important thing to get ready for a mega disaster is to 
prepare and to drive in to the public’s mind self-preparation. No 
government is big enough to do everything for everybody all the time. 
And we don’t want a government that big. We can’t afford a government 
that big and we don’t want one. We tried to teach people to prepare 
themselves. We did a better job of this after Katrina. ‘There’s a storm in 
the gulf; what are you going to do? Where are you going? When are you 
130 Haley Barbour, interview with author, August 7, 2014. 
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going to board up your house? When are you going to put away things that 
are outside that could blow away and bust up your neighbor’s house? Do 
you have your medicine, do you have some water? What’s the route 
you’re going to take to get there? Have you got a radio, a radio that runs 
on batteries? Does somebody know where you’re going to be?’ It’s not 
like a long list, but as you know, every time before and as Katrina 
approached, we preached to the public—through the radio, TV, 
newspapers, be prepared. Because self-preparation is so important. So 
teach self-preparation and then, of course, you prepare. I thought we 
prepared pretty well for a hurricane but it turns out that we didn’t get the 
hurricane we prepared for. It was no comparison to anything that had ever 
happened.132  
C. PRE-KATRINA: THE EVACUATION 
As tragic as the loss of 238 Mississippians in Katrina was, the loss of life could 
have been much worse. The evacuations from the lower coastal areas were the largest in 
recorded history. On Saturday night, August 27, Dr. Max Mayfield, then Director of the 
National Hurricane Center, called Governor Barbour to emphasize just how dangerous of 
a storm Hurricane Katrina was. Barbour and his wife, Marsha, were at their home in 
Yazoo City, MS. The Governor’s Mansion switchboard patched Dr. Mayfield through to 
the governor. Barbour told Mayfield, “Doctor, if you want to do something to help, you 
get the news media to start saying this storm’s going to be like Camille. People in 
Mississippi know what that means.”133 Barbour’s understanding of the severity of the 
storm and his grasp of how negatively Hurricane Camille affected three generations of 
Mississippians 36 years later drove the decision making of national, state, and local 
leaders and convinced thousands to take precautions that ultimately saved lives. That 
night (Saturday), Mayfield got the Weather Channel and the networks to start referring to 
this as a storm like Camille. Mayfield’s warning was important because people had 
hurricane fatigue from the two previous warnings of Ivan and Dennis. Consequently, 
Sunday’s evacuation numbers increased dramatically. Coastal residents took heed and 
moved inland.  
132 Haley Barbour, interview with author, August 7, 2014. 
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Barbour called former U.S. Senator Trent Lott to warn of the severity of the 
storm. Lott told Barbour that he was not concerned about his coastal home in Pascagoula, 
MS and that he was not going to board it up or take other precautions. Barbour told Lott, 
“Trent you’ve got to. This could be a bad storm and not taking the precautions sets a poor 
example.”134 Lott acquiesced and had his home boarded up. In the end, it did not matter. 
Lott’s home was one of the over 100,000 homes in Mississippi destroyed by Katrina.  
Barbour had to use some innovative thinking when it came to forcing a few 
nursing homes to evacuate. The privately run homes knew the difficulties and expense 
associated with an evacuation. However, the homes that would not evacuate received a 
great deal of funding from Medicaid. Barbour’s solution was to get the Director of 
Medicaid to call and in each instance, according to Barbour, “they got a better attitude” 
concerning the evacuation of their residents.135 Every nursing home in the coastal 
counties was evacuated prior to landfall, a move that ultimately saved many lives. 
D. THE SITUATION 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Mississippi in the early morning hours of 
Monday, August 29. The storm was so large and intense that there could not be any 
movement of response personnel from the central and northern parts of the state until the 
storm passed Hattiesburg at 5 pm on the August 29. Barbour waited the storm out in 
Jackson with the executive director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency. 
Reports of damage were sporadic as the day progressed. Communications with coastal 
emergency managers was lost just after noon on Monday.  
Early on Tuesday morning, Governor Barbour flew to the coast on the state’s twin 
engine plane. He landed at the Gulfport/Biloxi airport, which was also home to the 
Mississippi Air National Guard’s Combat Readiness Training Center (CRTC). At the 
CRTC, Barbour received a preliminary damage assessment from Adjutant General 
Harold Cross and then boarded a National Guard UH-60 helicopter for an aerial damage 
134 Ibid. 
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assessment. Accompanying Barbour were Cross, MEMA Executive Director Robert 
Latham, and FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer William (Bill) Carwile. 
What Barbour saw almost defied imagination. The entire area of the coast south 
of Interstate 10 was virtually annihilated. The primary east-west transportation corridor 
was U.S. Highway 90. The storm surge had destroyed wide swaths of the highway. The 
mile-long bridges that spanned the Biloxi Bay that connected Harrison and Jackson 
Counties and the bridge that spanned Bay St. Louis connecting Harrison and Hancock 
Counties were completely destroyed. Every home in Harrison County located between 
the Gulf and the CSX railway was destroyed by the massive storm surge. Barbour’s 
description of the initial helicopter flight: 
There were huge areas where no structures were standing and everything 
was gray. I—I couldn’t—I couldn’t grasp why was everything gray. 
Because I had flown in, landed at Gulfport, just gotten right on a 
helicopter—I hadn’t noticed at first, but of course everything was gray 
because it was covered in debris waist deep or head deep or, in some 
cases, 25 feet deep. And in many, many places, no building survived. 
Commercial buildings had a better chance of surviving, but you would see 
where hundreds of houses had been and none of them survived. That day 
they were all covered in debris. Later we created the verb ‘slabbed’—the 
verb for ‘my house was nothing left but a slab.’136 
After Barbour completed his aerial reconnaissance and the gravity of the situation 
became apparent, the first order of business was to establish a true chain of command and 
to determine whether or not the state’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 
was applicable to such an historic, catastrophic disaster. Barbour convened a meeting of 
key cabinet members as well as the county emergency managers from the six southern 
counties. It was immediately agreed upon that MEMA would operate a Unified 
Command Group that would base operations in Jackson, MS to coordinate the federal and 
interstate responses and a State Emergency Response Team Advance (SERT-A) on the 
coast. Governor Barbour briefed all parties that, as governor, he would be the incident 
commander. Barbour was very clear, however, that the coastal leadership, as well as the 
state-level leaders, were empowered to make decisions without fear of “micro-
136 Haley Barbour, interview with author, August 7, 2014. 
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management” from his office. Barbour quoted one of his Washington business partners in 
his guidance to his leaders, “No options, no problems. If you don’t have any choice, you 
just do what you have to do.”137  
Barbour’s recollection of the initial meeting: 
And I think that is one of the things that Mississippi did well, that we—we 
were dealing with unknown, uncharted ground and made decisions that 
were decisions of first impression—that—one of the keys that I think for 
what we did was that first, everybody realized that somebody had to be in 
charge. And the only logical person to be in charge was the Governor. 
So the local officials—which as many of them were Democrats as 
Republicans—and yet they all agreed, or accepted, that I would be in 
charge. And some of them agreed with the decisions I made, some of them 
didn’t, but we worked together. We worked together very well. They 
always knew that they had access to me and that I was going to at least 
give them a fair hearing. We also—I’m also proud of the fact that I made a 
lot of decisions that we ultimately saw weren’t working as well as we 
thought they would, so we changed them. Because that’s one of—that’s a 
part of leadership that is often ignored. You show me someone who’s 
never made a bad decision, and I’ll show you someone who’s never made 
a decision. But more, fundamentally, when you’re the leader after this 
kind of incredible catastrophe, it’s hard to imagine what you face.138 
Once the command relationship was established, Barbour worked hard to get the 
word out to the state and to the nation describing the utter devastation. He considered it 
his primary function as governor to describe what Katrina had done to his state. His intent 
was to relay the severity in enough detail to get the thousands of volunteers and 
responders to stay away from the impacted area until the search and rescue operations 
had culminated and the roads were clear. This was a Herculean effort given the amount of 
media attention focused on the coast of Mississippi and New Orleans. Barbour fully 
understood that any additional assets flowing into the area would be more of a hindrance 
than a help as the coast began to search for its missing residents.  
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Barbour’s recollection of the initial press briefings:  
To stand up and to have to tell the public through the press, ‘Here’s what’s 
down there.’ That was hard, but they needed to know the truth. And you 
remember, we told them ‘you can’t go there; we’re not going to allow the 
public to come down there yet’ for a variety of reasons. Certainly, search 
and rescue was one of the reasons. There were no roads to drive on in lots 
of area and they would just get in the way while we were trying to see if 
there were any survivors and to recover the bodies of the people there, and 
also the security purposes, the fewer people that are running around, the 
better. The public accepted that. By and large, people waited. We didn’t 
make them wait but, I don’t remember, three or four days. But when you 
have to tell people you can’t go down there because it’s so bad, the public, 
I’m sure, was shocked but they needed to hear the truth. And that’s—I 
think that was a very important thing that we did. We repeatedly tried to 
give people an accurate picture and we did that for months and years.139  
The inability of FEMA to get life-sustaining commodities into the impacted 
region became readily apparent to Barbour and his staff. Barbour recognized that 
assigning blame rather than focusing on solving the problem was counterproductive. On 
Thursday, September 1, Barbour called a meeting with key National Guard, MEMA and 
FEMA representatives to work on a resolution to the water and Meal Ready to Eat 
(MRE) issues. FEMA reported that it simply could not get an accurate assessment of 
where the commodities were and in what quantities. Barbour was told it would be several 
days before an accurate assessment of the disposition of the commodities would be 
available. Realizing that this was not acceptable, Barbour asked Major General Cross to 
explore military avenues for acquiring MREs and water. Cross immediately contacted the 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Within 24 hours, C-5, C-17, and C-130 aircraft were 
delivering MREs and water to the Air National Guard Base at Gulfport. Ultimately, over 
1.2 million MREs and almost one million gallons of bottled water were delivered by the 
military.140  
Barbour did not wait for the military deliveries to begin. He tasked MEMA with 
finding vendors in-state. Tons of ice and water were delivered from vendors throughout 
the state. Barbour leveraged his relationship with the Helton family from Yazoo City, 
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who owned the local ice business, and the family immediately provided all of their 
available resources to the coast. By Friday afternoon, the National Guard and local first 
responders were delivering much needed commodities to the stricken coast.  
Barbour continuously pushed his cabinet members to think big and not get fixated 
on status quo. Barbour began getting reports of rural residents located miles inland who 
could not travel to obtain life-sustaining commodities due to trees and other debris 
blocking roadways. Barbour tasked Major General Cross to investigate using his 
helicopters to reach these stranded residents. Army aviators located over 1,000 
Mississippians stranded due to the timber destruction and immediately began delivering 
food, water, medicine, baby formula, and other critical supplies.  
During the first week, Barbour was working diligently to ensure that President 
Bush, FEMA, and Department of Defense were aware of the situation. Barbour realized 
that the more information passed to Capitol Hill, the more federal funding would flow 
into the state. Barbour also knew that with federal monetary assistance came federal 
offers of leadership.  
Barbour described his relationship with FEMA and Federal Coordinating Officer 
Bill Carwile: 
Bill Carwile came in and we had agreed to have a unified command. I said 
that sounds good as long as it reports to me; it doesn’t report to 
Washington. They said we’ll work that out at—and Carwile and I talked 
about it and he said we’re not going to have any problem with them. He 
said certain things have to be reported back to federal superiors, but for 
calling the shots, he accepted that Mississippi knows more about 
Mississippi than Washington knows about Mississippi. So with Bill—so 
we had a unified command. That worked very well. We worked together 
well, it reduced duplication, but it also had a lot of camaraderie. It was not 
antagonistic.141 
The next challenge from federal officials came from Lieutenant General Russell 
Honore, the Commander of First U.S. Army. Barbour and President Bush had discussed 
the issues in New Orleans and whether or not the entire response should be federalized, 
that is, putting a federal official in charge of the overall response. Barbour had previously 
141 Haley Barbour, interview with author, August 7, 2014. 
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met Honore and had a great deal of respect for the general. However, Barbour knew that 
the way active duty forces would respond differed greatly from the way the National 
Guard responded. Most importantly, active component forces are forbidden by the Posse 
Comitatus Act from performing law enforcement actions. Secondly, active component 
forces do not, as a general rule, understand the local systems of government and how they 
were expected to interact with local responders. Last, Barbour fully understood that 
federalizing the response would usurp his authority, that of his adjutant general, and that 
of the other state-level officials. Barbour quickly thanked the president and General 
Honore for the offer but instead elected to request thousands of National Guardsmen 
under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact and placed those troops under 
the command and control of Major General Cross. This move left Barbour as the 
Commander in Chief of all military forces operating in Mississippi.142  
During the first week of response operations, Governor Barbour focused his 
efforts on getting the necessary commodities and responders to the impacted area while 
strongly discouraging volunteer organizations, private citizens, and corporate interests 
from coming to the coast and becoming part of the problem rather than part of the 
solution. Barbour recognized that he would become the “face of Katrina response” and 
would shape the response and recovery activities for months and years.  
What Governor Barbour did not do is interfere with his cabinet’s and the local 
emergency management directors’ efforts. Barbour knew that each of these individuals 
knew his or her job and any interference by him would slow the response. In addition, he 
fully understood the strategic role he played and that his place was not trying to run the 
tactical response. The governor had selected cabinet members who were good leaders, 
and he had confidence in their abilities to guide their organizations during this disaster. 
Furthermore, he understood the saying, “all disasters start and end locally.” The county 
and city leaders throughout the state knew how to respond in their jurisdictions. His job 
was to coordinate for federal aid in the form of manpower and funding, not to direct the 
response at the city and county level. 
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E. RECOVERY 
By the following Monday after the storm hit, Governor Barbour knew that the 
response phase was over and that the state was entering the recovery phase. Quickly, 
Barbour formulated his plan for the recovery effort in Mississippi. His first task in the 
recovery phase was to issue guidance that would shape the way all Mississippians would 
begin to rebuild their lives.  
Barbour on his concept of recovery: 
Four times in our history our state has suffered from a mega disaster: The 
Civil War, the flood of 1927, Hurricane Camille, which was an awful 
hurricane and much more powerful than Katrina as far as wind velocity 
was concerned. Camille was a smaller-sized mega disaster, and then this 
one, Katrina. I was determined that we were going to rebuild the Coast 
and south Mississippi back bigger and better than it was, because we had 
not done that after Camille.  
In 1927, during the flood in the Delta where I’m from, the homes of both 
sets of my grandparents flooded and there was very little help after it.  
After the Civil War, no help at all.  
After Katrina I felt we were going to have a chance to get help and I was 
determined we were going to use that help to build the Coast back bigger 
and better than it was. Really all of south Mississippi. Pretty quickly it 
became obvious what the three priorities are: If your goal is to get people 
to return to their communities and rebuild their communities, they’ve got 
to believe they can work; they’ve got to believe they can have housing; 
they’ve got to believe their kids can go to school. If you don’t get schools 
back open, they’re not coming back. And this was clearly my goal. I knew 
Tuesday, the 30th of August we were going to be years and years 
rebuilding, getting the Coast back to what it could be. But that was one of 
my goals that I said repeatedly: ‘We’re not going to build the Coast back 
like it was, we’re going to build the Coast back like it can be.’ And that’s 
not for Jackson to decide, it’s not for Washington to decide what should 
the Coast be like, it should be the people on the Coast who decide.143 
Barbour repeatedly reiterated to his staff and cabinet: jobs, homes and schools. 
Each was interconnected with the other and essential to rebuilding the coast. Every action 
associated with one had to consider the other two. Governor Barbour was totally 
143 Haley Barbour, interview with author, August 7, 2014. 
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cognizant of the fact that if people left the coast, especially those with professional 
degrees, the likelihood of getting them to move back was slim. Getting the businesses and 
schools back open and getting a place for coastal residents to stay was paramount to 
coastal recovery. He knew there was competition for Mississippi’s most important 
resource, its people: 
I thought it was better to let people start rebuilding, to give people 
confidence, to give people hope, to let people say, ‘Biloxi is going to come 
back’; ‘Gulfport is going to come back.’ ‘This is going to be a great place 
to live, I want to live here.’ Within a week of the storm, doctors and nurses 
on the Coast started getting calls from hospitals in Atlanta, Birmingham 
and Nashville, Memphis, Shreveport, Dallas saying, ‘come practice here. 
Your hospital’s gone, come move to Dallas.’ And we were competing—
and it wasn’t just healthcare workers. We were competing to keep those 
people on the Coast. I thought, and still think, progress that is at least 
weekly if not daily was really important to people, that they felt like ‘I’m 
living in this crummy, cramped FEMA trailer, but it’s worth it because my 
town is going to be back and I’m going to be part of it so I can put up with 
this.’ I’m sure after three years some of them would have liked to have 
shot the governor who gave them that attitude.144  
1. Jobs 
Barbour immediately understood that debris removal was not only critical to 
beginning of the recovery phase but also essential in creating jobs. Immediately after the 
storm, public works departments along the coast, augmented by thousands of National 
Guardsmen, cleared debris out of roadways simply by pushing the debris into the ditches 
and sides of the roads. These efforts were stopgaps to facilitate search and rescue and to 
allow for freedom of movement. By the end of the first week in September, public works 
departments, county road crews and National Guard Engineers had cleared over 4,000 
miles of roads.145 This is equivalent to clearing a two-lane highway from the tip to Maine 
to the southern end of California. However, the debris had to be completely removed 
from property and properly disposed of. This was no simple feat in that the storm created 
over 46 million cubic yards of debris. For an historical perspective, Hurricane Andrew, 
the previous most expensive storm to clean up after, created only 22 million cubic yards 
144 Ibid. 
145 A Failure of Initiative: Final Report, 73. 
49 
                                                 
of debris, and it took 11 months to completely haul off, bury or burn 46 million cubic 
yards of debris. It also took 11 months for Florida to clean up all of the debris from 
Hurricane Andrew.146 Mississippi cleaned up over twice as much debris in the same 
amount of time.147 This was significant in getting the coast postured for the rebuilding 
phase.  
Governor Barbour knew just how negatively the industrial base on the Gulf Coast 
had been hit. Shipbuilding and fishing were two of the most important sources of income 
for the coastal population, and so too was the casino industry and tourism. Each of these 
sectors was essentially wiped out. Furthermore, it would be months before shipbuilding 
could resume and could be years before the casinos could be rebuilt. Much of the fishing 
fleet was destroyed and there was nothing of interest for tourists to come see, unless it 
was utter devastation. Barbour realized that until the infrastructure was rebuilt, at least to 
a level that the major industries could re-open, that temporary jobs would be the norm. 
With over 47,000 workers suddenly out of work, Barbour focused on the occupational 
sector that offered the most jobs: debris removal. Barbour was adamant that all debris 
removal contractors would be Mississippians. He did not want to “outsource” jobs to out-
of-state businesses. Furthermore, as much as possible, Barbour mandated that the truck 
drivers, heavy machine operators, administrative clerks, ditch diggers— and every facet 
of the clean-up worker—be from the areas impacted by the storm. In addition, he insisted 
that this was foremost a Mississippi disaster and that Mississippians would clean up the 
mess. Consequently, unemployment rates went from over 20 percent immediately after 
the storm to 10 percent by January 2006.148 Barbour petitioned Secretary of Labor, 
Elaine Chao, to sign a national emergency for more than $100 million to create 25,000 
temporary jobs in the disaster areas, largely to assist in clean-up and recovery efforts.149 
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Governor Barbour starting calling on business and industry leaders on the coast to 
get their businesses opened as soon as possible. Chevron Global Refining, located in 
Pascagoula, MS, was one of the first to respond. Prior to Katrina, the refinery produced 
325,000 barrels of refined products per day and employed over 3,700 workers.150 
Barbour realized that Chevron’s restarting of the refinery was essential not only to the 
coast, but also to the entire nation’s economy. The second order effects of Katrina’s 
destruction on the coast were beginning to impact the nation. Chevron refines the 
majority of jet fuel used at East Coast airports. Therefore, getting jet fuel refined was 
essential to the entire airline industry. Key to recovery was the restoration of power to the 
facility. Barbour, as well as other elected officials from the coast, worked closely with 
Mississippi Power to get the power lines and sub-stations back online for the refinery. 
There was a great deal of debate on whether power restoration should be to individuals or 
to businesses. Barbour led the effort to convince the public that getting power back to 
large employers was essential in getting the coast back on its feet. As a result, the refinery 
commenced refining operations on September 12, and over 1,000 workers were back at 
work. Chevron opened temporary housing facilities that housed over 1,100 workers and 
their families. By the end of September, Chevron was operating at 56 percent of its pre-
Katrina operation level.151  
Barbour’s call for jobs and housing was answered by other companies on the 
coast. The Oreck Corporation is a family-owned vacuum manufacturer based in New 
Orleans, LA with its sole manufacturing plant on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Company 
founder David Oreck worked closely with the Barbour administration in getting his plant 
back up and operational in the aftermath of the storm. Oreck brought in dozens of 
campers for employees and continued to pay all employees, regardless of whether they 
returned to work. Oreck also brought in medical services, food, water, generators, and all 
essentials to provide for his employees. Barbour recognized Oreck’s commitment and 
ensured critical services such as water, sewer, and power were supplied to Oreck’s 
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375,000 square foot Long Beach, MS plant. As a result, the plant was back in operation 
10 days after the storm. Within a week of re-opening, the plant was operating at pre-
storm capacity. The company said that, by getting its facilities up and running, it was able 
to provide its employees motivation to continue to rebuild after the storm. “Essentially, 
when we turned the light on, the message that we were giving our people was that they 
had a basis for hope,” Oreck says. “They were able to see a path towards a normal life 
again.”152 
One unemployment issue that was unforeseen by many was the issue of voluntary 
unemployment. Many coastal residents took advantage of being able to draw 
unemployment while they were rebuilding their homes. In most cases, these were highly 
specialized employees from the shipyards, oil refineries, or construction industries. It was 
important to the Barbour administration, once it was discovered that a great many 
qualified laborers were staying home to affect necessary repairs that these people return 
to work in order to get businesses open and operational and to get taxes flowing into the 
city, county, and state coffers. When federally subsidized unemployment benefits were 
about to expire, Louisiana officials requested an extension. Mississippi did not. The 
immediate effect was a large-scale return to work by over 26,000 workers. In fact, by 
April 2006, there were 1500 more Mississippians employed than were before Hurricane 
Katrina struck.153  
2. Homes 
The massive destruction caused by Katrina left more than 100,000 Mississippians 
homeless. Temporary options such as hotels, apartments, and condominiums were not 
available because they too were destroyed by the storm. This left state and federal 
officials with only one viable option: to ship in thousands of temporary trailers. The 
ensuing FEMA temporary housing mission became the largest and fastest deployment of 
travel trailers and mobile homes in FEMA history.154 To expedite operations, FEMA 
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utilized in-stock travel trailers or enacted pre-existing contracts with companies to 
provide temporary housing units. The initial deployment of trailers was extremely slow. 
This was attributed to the complicated nature of procuring trailers, identifying and 
inspecting suitable sites, dealing with the massive debris removal operations, and the 
establishment of utilities to sustain the trailers. Barbour pushed hard throughout 
September and October to cut through the bureaucracy associated with federal 
contracting and with site inspections. He did not want to establish large trailer parks. He 
wanted displaced residents to live in trailers on their own property. He realized that this 
gave them a sense of ownership and ensured that the thousands of vacant lots caused by 
the storm would not remain vacant indefinitely. Once operations began running at 
maximum efficiency, more than 500 travel trailers were placed each day, and by January 
1, 2006, there were 34,000 units in operation. That number peaked at 38,000 in May 2006 
before beginning a steady decline as housing stock began to be replenished. Collectively, 
more than 45,000 temporary housing units were occupied in Mississippi after Hurricane 
Katrina.155 
Barbour was determined to give coastal residents a “sense of place,” that is, a 
belief that what was theirs before the storm was still theirs. As the rebuilding efforts 
began in earnest in 2006, Barbour pushed for the infrastructure efforts to commence even 
if the lots where people’s homes were destroyed had not been cleared. His reasoning was 
that he wanted all necessary public utilities ready to connect to homes and trailers when 
the former residents returned:  
We would get general debris removal, clean off the streets and the rights 
of way, and then we would lay new water and sewer lines. And that’s 
great as you’re always trying to have a fast pace. Except if we left too 
many houses that had been totally ruined, the government doesn’t clean up 
that private property typically. Then later the private owner goes in there 
and hires somebody to clean up his debris from his house on his lot, and 
his contractor breaks the water and sewer line by driving a big piece of 
equipment over the lines. I can’t tell you how many times that happened, 
and we just had to make a decision. It is better to let that happen than for 
people to say ‘I can’t rebuild my house because they haven’t put in water 
155 Office of Governor Haley Barbour, Five Years after Katrina: Progress Report on Recovery, 
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and sewer.’ And so God knows we spent a lot of money repairing and 
replacing water and sewer lines that got broken after it had been 
reinstalled. Still, it was worth it because people came back quickly.156 
3. Schools 
Hurricane Katrina impacted Mississippi’s schools throughout the state. The 
school year was barely a week old when the storm struck. Sixteen schools were 
completely destroyed, 24 received severe damage, and 263 schools received mild to 
moderate damage.157 Of Mississippi’s 152 school districts, only 14 did not miss any 
school days due to the storm.158 In addition to the damage and destruction to their 
facilities, school superintendents were dealing with displaced students, displaced faculty, 
and staff and the severe psychological issues associated with the devastation that was 
Katrina.  
Dr. Hank M. Bounds was the State Superintendent of Education and brought with 
him a wealth of knowledge and expertise and an experienced, dedicated staff. Before 
being named the State Superintendent in August 2005, Dr. Bounds served as 
superintendent of the Pascagoula, MS School District. He previously was principal of two 
high schools and one K-12 school. Bounds was intimately familiar with the coast and 
knew all of the key educators in the southern counties. He understood Governor 
Barbour’s concerns about permanently losing the coast’s population if schools, jobs, and 
housing issues were not addressed. Bounds was determined to get the schools opened 
before the beginning of November. Despite the widespread damage, lack of fuel, 
electricity, cellular phone service, and land cleared of debris, all school districts were 
opened by mid-October. The final school district, Bay St. Louis-Waveland, reopened on 
November 7 when its portable buildings arrived from the manufacturer.  
Both Dr. Bounds and Governor Barbour fully understood that the key to getting 
the schools opened by November was getting Congress and the U.S. Department of 
156 Haley Barbour, interview with author, August 7, 2014. 
157 Hank M. Bounds, Mississippi Department of Education Report to the Governor (Jackson, MS: 
Mississippi Department of Education, 2006), 1. 
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Education to change its funding policies on assisting students impacted by the storm. 
Barbour and Bounds travelled to Washington, DC to present their recommendations to 
Congress and the Department of Education in September 2005. Governor Barbour’s 
recollection of the visit: 
The Bush Administration’s education plan was to give money to school 
districts that took in dislocated children. The children who had gone to 
school at Biloxi or, more often, who had gone to school in New Orleans, 
went to Houston or wherever. The program would give Houston schools 
money, so much per displaced student that they have taken in. Well, I got 
Hank and we went to Washington and met with the Secretary of Education 
and with, interestingly, John Boehner, who at the time wasn’t Speaker of 
the House, he was Chairman of the House Education Committee. And 
Hank laid out for Margaret Spellings, the Secretary of Education, our plan: 
‘We’re going to have all our kids back in school in Mississippi in 
November and under your plan you’re not going to give us any help. Your 
plan ought to reward and encourage people to get their schools back open 
and, instead, you’re going to give X-thousand dollars per child whose 
schools are still closed.’ Margaret, to her credit, said, ‘you know, you’re 
right. Let us look at it.’ Then we went and saw Boehner and Boehner 
agreed. Boehner’s Chief of Staff was Paula Nowakowski who had worked 
for me at the RNC [Republican National Committee], but Paula didn’t 
have to twists his arm. Boehner saw it and as it turned out, a large 
percentage of the federal aid in the wake of Katrina went to schools that 
got reopened. Mississippi K-12 schools received more than $350 million 
where we would have received next to nothing under the original plan. 
But, again, that was critical to getting people to come home.  
Mississippi’s schools received over $323 million in federal dollars through the 
Hurricane Katrina Education Recovery Act: they received $100 million in Emergency 
Impact Aid for Displaced Students, $222 million through the Immediate Aid to Restart 
School Operations, and $687,000 in funds for homeless education.159  
In addition to federal assistance, Mississippi schools received tremendous 
assistance from across the state and across the country due to Dr. Bounds’ and his staff’s 
diligence. Donations of goods and services, as well as monetary donations, helped the 
schools, teachers, and students in a myriad of ways from the day after the hurricane 
159 Hurricane Education Recovery Act, Cong. Res. H.R 2863-113 (2005), 266.  
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through the end of the year, providing everything from bottled water to backpacks, from 
pencils to prom dresses.160 
In addition, the Mississippi School Boards Association (MSBA) established the 
Mississippi Hurricane Katrina School Relief Fund (KSRF). The fund was designed to 
help schools get the emergency relief needed to become operational, assist displaced 
school employees and their families, return children affected by Hurricane Katrina to 
their normal routines as soon as possible and assure that displaced children did not have 
to drop out of school due to the financial hardship.161 
Cisco Systems made a $40 million commitment in a multi-phase, three-year 
education initiative in the Gulf Coast region to aid in post Hurricane Katrina rebuilding 
activities. The Cisco 21st Century Schools (21S) 21S initiative was a blueprint for 
reconstructing and improving schools that began in Mississippi and has been replicated 
around the country, including schools in New York and New Jersey impacted by 
Hurricane Sandy.162 Cisco brought together a coalition of public, private, and non-profit 
organizations that provided a holistic approach to building a twenty-first century 
educational program, which greatly benefitted the Gulf Coast students. 
Dr. Bounds began a campaign to enlist other corporations to invest in 
Mississippi’s school children. For example, BellSouth donated $2.5 million to provide 
virtual courses to affected students, train teachers in online course delivery, and provide 
support for schools and learning centers to accommodate student needs. Also, Chevron 
launched the Energy for Learning Initiative, an $18 million program to support public 
school education in 23 Louisiana and Mississippi school districts affected by Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita. Additionally, Chevron pledged $8 million to aid short-term relief and 
reconstruction. Best Buy Co. donated $8 million in a relief package to help K–12 schools 
damaged or destroyed by Katrina. Furthermore, Best Buy launched a special te@ch 
emergency response program with contributions of $3 million in October for K-12 
160 Hank M. Bounds, Report on Mississippi’s Schools for the Governor’s Commission on Recovery, 
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schools with increased enrollment of students displaced by the hurricanes. The te@ch 
program awarded Best Buy gift cards to schools that were applied toward improving the 
classroom experience during the year for all students. Gift cards were awarded in 
amounts up to $5,000 per school.163  
The speed at which school districts reopened is testament to the dedication and 
commitment of Barbour’s cabinet and educators throughout the state and nation. It would 
have been understandable if test scores had suffered in the aftermath of the storm and the 
disruption it caused. After all, students, teachers, and administrators were living in 
cramped FEMA trailers, the conditions on the coast were not conducive to learning and 
the future of the coast was uncertain in the first two years of rebuilding. Despite these 
adversities, the results of the state tests administered in the spring of 2006 revealed that 
the students had not just held their own during the year of Katrina, they had excelled.164  
Of the 122 schools in the 16 school districts in the six southernmost counties, 63 
were rated Level 5, Superior-Performing under the Mississippi Accountability System, 
which ranks schools from Level 1, Low-Performing to Level 5, Superior-Performing. 
Additionally, 39 schools were rated Level 4, Exemplary and 30 schools were rated Level 
3, Successful. None of the schools was rated Level 1 or Level 2, Under-Performing.165 
4. Rebuilding 
Seven days after Katrina’s landfall, Governor Barbour established the Governor’s 
Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal (the Commission) and selected 
Mississippian and former Netscape CEO Jim Barksdale as its chairman. The governor’s 
directive to the commission was threefold: solicit the best ideas for recovery, rebuilding 
and renewal from both public and private sectors; develop a broad vision for a better Gulf 
Coast and southern Mississippi; and involve local citizens and elected officials in the 
process of developing and endorsing these ideas.166 Specifically, the governor asked the 
163 Ibid., 7. 
164 Ibid., 10. 
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166 Diane Dorney, Mississippi Renewal Forum Summary Report (Gaithersburg, MS: Town Paper, 
2005), 3. 
57 
                                                 
commission to provide local leaders with ideas and tools to help them envision what their 
region could look like five, 10, 20, and 30 years from now and to recommend strategies 
and tools for achieving these goals.  
With this guidance, the commission solicited input from experts and industry-
leaders in housing, planning, and other areas. Additionally, and most importantly, the 
commission sought advice and input from the citizens of the affected counties. Issue 
committees, comprised of local stakeholders from both the public and private sector, 
were formed to evaluate challenges and identify opportunities within specific sectors 
such as infrastructure, finance, agriculture, tourism, education, health and human 
services, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Over 50 town hall 
meetings across 33 counties were held to receive ideas and opinions on the long-term 
recovery and renewal of south Mississippi. The commission stressed that while the 
process of identifying problems and recommending solutions was important, 
implementation and accountability should also be addressed, especially in light of the 
failure to institute many of the recommendations after Hurricane Camille. Secondly, the 
commission was guided by Governor Barbour’s insistence that local governments and 
citizens would control their own destiny in rebuilding their communities. 
After thousands of hours of input from committees and intensive research, the 
Commission submitted its final report to Governor Barbour on December 31, 2005. The 
report, After Katrina: Building Back Better than Ever,167 offered over 240 specific 
recommendations. The recommendations fell into four broad categories:  
• Infrastructure, including land use, transportation, public services, and 
housing  
• Economic development, including tourism, small businesses, agriculture, 
forestry, marine resources, and defense and government contracting  
• Human services, including education, health and human services and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)  
• Other special considerations, including finance, long-term policy 
recommendations and a roadmap to greater accountability 
167 Ibid., 8. 
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With the Commission focused on the rebuilding efforts for the coast, Barbour began 
working the halls of Congress for the funding to restore the coast to a better, more viable 
place to live than before the storm. Of his trips to Washington, DC, he explains: 
I went to Washington 17 times between the storm and Christmas to get the 
law passed that was the Special Disaster Assistance. Senator Cochran 
deserves more credit for it than anybody. We continued to have a good 
relationship with FEMA, we had a good relationship with HUD. HUD 
wouldn’t normally matter in a disaster, but in Senator Cochran’s special 
disaster assistance package that was passed in December of 2005, a lot of 
the money was funneled through HUD because they have a program 
called Community Development Block Grant and it was the program that 
we determined, working with Cochran’s office, gave the state maximum 
flexibility. That was one of the very serious considerations; we didn’t want 
Washington telling us how to spend the money. 
The governor’s recovery plan was largely funded by Congress. The appropriations 
package passed in December 2005, Public Law 109–148, allocated over $10 billion in 
recovery funds that became the foundation on which the state based its recovery efforts. 
The legislation provided help for housing, medical centers, schools and colleges, 
highways and bridges, employment, law enforcement, human services, coastal 
restoration, and other important needs.168 Subsequent legislation added more funding 
and changed program requirements to tailor to Katrina needs. In the November 2005 
plan, Mississippi requested funding through the agencies, which matched the mission of 
the projects. For example, $600 million was requested for water and wastewater 
infrastructure through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the E n v ironmental Protection 
Agency, and the Department of Agriculture (USDA); $500 million for the Port of 
Gulfport restoration was requested through the Department of Transportation; $300 
million was requested for economic development through the Department of Commerce 
and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Community Development Block Grants 
(CDBG); and $150 million was requested for community facilities repairs through USDA 
Rural Development Community Facilities Grants.169 
168 Five Years After Katrina: Progress Report on Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal, report (Jackson: 
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Instead of spreading funding over multiple agencies and creating new programs, 
Congress, led by Senator Thad Cochran, chose to direct funding for many of 
Mississippi’s requests through the Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) 
Program. This option allowed maximum program flexibility and reduced existing 
bureaucratic structures in each state to manage CDBG funds. To ensure maximum 
flexibility for Mississippi to implement its priorities for a comprehensive recovery, 
Congress included specific language requiring the HUD secretary to waive normal 
CDBG requirements where necessary, with the exception of requirements related to fair 
housing, labor standards and the environment. In addition, Congress allocated $5.4 
billion to Mississippi, which used the funding for housing, infrastructure and economic 
development needs as identified within the Governor’s Comprehensive Recovery Plan.170 
The Barbour administration worked closely with the Mississippi Development Authority 
(MDA) and HUD to ensure that these funds were used to spur housing, infrastructure and 
economic development recovery. In addition to the $5.4 billion in discretionary funding, 
the CDBG also delivered over $2 billion directly to homeowners. To further ensure that 
the funds were properly allocated and spent, Barbour asked for and received $5million to 
hire fraud investigators to investigate homeowners, building contractors and debris 
removal contractors.171  
The immediate source of funding that flowed from FEMA to the state came from 
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Generally, all 
Stafford Act programs require a cost-share from the state, local governments, or other 
non-federal sources. Typically, a state and the entities within a state must pay for 25 
percent of costs, and that amount may be reduced to 10 percent following a major 
disaster. Recognizing the severe impact of Katrina on the Gulf Coast region and the 
enormous cost burden of cost-share for Stafford Act recovery programs, Barbour and 
Senator Cochran petitioned Congress to waive the cost share for all states impacted by 
170 Ibid., 15. 
171 Ibid., 17. 
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Katrina. As a result, in 2007 Congress waived the non-federal match requirement for all 
Stafford Act programs. Stafford Act funding for Mississippi totaled $11.9 billion.172 
Governor Barbour was instrumental in the Mississippi Department of 
Employment Services (MDES) acquiring a $95 million National Emergency Grant 
(NEG) to aid in the recovery efforts on reemployment and job training. NEG programs 
focused on temporary job placement and support and long-term goals of job training, 
filling workforce needs in the manufacturing, shipbuilding, health care, supportive 
services, construction, information technology, and hospitality services sectors. MDES 
administered several programs NEG programs including; Temporary Recovery Jobs, 
Training Programs, Supportive Services and the Working your Way Back Home 
Program.173  
The Temporary Recovery Jobs Program provided temporary employment through 
public sector and non-profit employers to more than 2,500 individuals. Participants were 
eligible to be employed for up to 18 months or paid up to $36,000. Many of these 
temporary jobs led to permanent employment. The training program provided funds for 
on-the-job training, classroom-based training, or private training. More than 6,500 
residents took advantage of this job-enhancing program. Supportive Services provided 
support payments to individuals enrolled in training. These supplemental payments paid 
for services such as day care, transportation costs, and school supplies. Over 1,300 
workers enrolled in this program.174 Another program, the Working Your Way Back 
Home Program helped Mississippians who evacuated 151 miles or more from home get 
the assistance they needed to find a job. Eligible costs included reimbursement for travel 
and relocation expenses. More than 1,500 residents participated in this program.175 
Finally, the Pathways to Construction Training provided training through area 
community and junior colleges to meet construction industry needs, which grew 
172 Ibid., 27. 
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significantly as Mississippi rebuilt after Katrina. More than 6,000 construction workers 
received training through this program.176 
Casino revenues on the Mississippi Gulf Coast in 2004 totaled nearly $1.23 
billion, the highest revenues since casino gambling came to the coast in the early 
1990s.177 By 2005, the region’s casinos were pumping nearly $500,000 in tax revenue to 
the state treasury daily. After the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the casinos generated 
no income for September, October and November, causing their profits to plummet to 
$886 million for the year.178  
The gaming industry in Mississippi was at a cross roads. Rebuilding the casinos 
on barges exposed them to future risk of destruction by another storm. Across the 
industry and investment firms, there was a real concern about rebuilding the gaming 
industry in an area susceptible to hurricanes. In late September, Governor Barbour called 
a special legislative session to discuss the rebuilding efforts for the state. In his opening 
statement to lawmakers on the session’s first day on September 27, Barbour urged 
legislators to change the gaming laws in order to rebuild the industry:  
First, of all of you who have been there, you’ve seen the catastrophic 
destruction of the casinos and the destruction wrought by those behemoths 
when they crashed into buildings and vehicles. We can’t return the casinos 
to the way they were. It would be irresponsible. 
How about putting them up on stilts, but still over the water? That would 
be better than it was, but it would greatly limit rebuilding and, in my 
opinion, result in a return to the old status quo. 
If we want to see much better quality development by the casino 
companies; if we want world-class resorts that will be about much more 
than just gaming, if we want to rebuild the Coast bigger and better than 
ever; I believe we will fail if we don’t allow the casino to come on shore, 
even if only a few hundred feet. 
Making the casinos sit over the water on stilts will not stimulate the 
investment we want. A small adjustment of a few hundred feet, but 
176 Ibid. 
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consistent with the original law of being tied to the water, is the best 
chance, not only for getting the thousands of employees back to work 
sooner, but to have even more employees later and make our Coast a 
world-class destination resort. 
Many will see the vote on shore-based gaming as the first defining vote of 
where Mississippi is headed. Will it be business as usual; the same old 
same old? Or are we going to lift our horizons and take advantage of this 
opportunity to have something better.179 
Lawmakers approved the measure to bring the casinos onshore, and Barbour 
signed it into law on October 17, 2005. The new law allowed casino operators to build on 
land as long as the new casinos were within 800 feet of the waterfront.180 
With the ability to now build casinos on-shore, the casino industry began 
rebuilding rapidly. By 2008, there were 11 casinos operating on the coast. Prior to 
Katrina, there were 12 properties. Slot machines and table games were at approximately 
85 percent of the pre-Katrina levels.181 However, revenues were up considerably from 
their pre-Katrina levels. For 2007 and 2008, Gulf Coast casino revenues posted records, 
coming in at $1.3 billion and $1.26 billion respectively.182 In addition, the gaming 
industry in 2008 employed over 17,000 workers along the coast, which rivaled the 
employment numbers before Katrina struck.183 
The Port of Gulfport was the third largest Container Port in the Gulf of Mexico 
prior to Katrina.184 However, it was only able to accommodate small ships due to the 
depth of the channel and the lack of large materiel handling cranes. Katrina’s surge 
destroyed the port and the containers on the port caused extensive damage to buildings 
inland as the surge swept them up to a mile from the port. To restore the port facilities, as 
well as address the damage in the surrounding community from surge-displaced 
179 Haley R. Barbour, “Katrina Special-Session Speech” (speech, 2005 Mississippi Special Legislative 
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containers, $570 million in CDBG was allocated to the Mississippi State Port Authority 
at Gulfport.185 The funds were allocated for restoration of public infrastructure and 
publicly owned facilities that were damaged or destroyed during Katrina and to better 
protect the surrounding community during future storms.186  
Governor Barbour received a great deal of criticism for dedicating over $570 
million to the port. He was accused of diverting funding for low-income housing and 
other initiatives to help the poor; however, Governor Barbour was able to see the long-
term effects of a new port that benefited the coast, the state, and the entire region. 
Barbour’s vision on the port restoration: 
A question arose: Should we rebuild the Port as a sleepy banana port like 
it has been for 50 years, or was this the time to try to compete with New 
Orleans? We actually had more container traffic than New Orleans had 
before the storm. We thought we could have a whole lot more container 
traffic because New Orleans is a day up the river, a day down the river. 
It’s more expensive for the shipping companies. Mobile was making 
improvements, and they have made improvements. They have an 
advantage in that they have a deeper channel than we’ve got. So it was 
clear to me that we were going to get resources that we could use to get 
the Port to where it could be the biggest container port on the Gulf. Why? 
It’s closest to Chicago. The shortest route from a port on the Gulf of 
Mexico to Chicago, Illinois, which is the biggest city in the Midwest, is to 
go out of the Port of Gulfport on Kansas City Southern, hit the Canadian 
National near Hattiesburg and go straight to Chicago via Jackson. And we 
confirmed that with shipping companies and the railroad. The problem is 
the railroad from Hattiesburg south, Kansas City Southern, was not 
modern; trains could only go ten miles an hour and containers could not 
double stack. So we got the government to give us a grant and then we 
took some state money and the Kansas City Southern put up their money 
and we were way down the road of making the Kansas City Southern 
where you could go 59 miles an hour, double stacked, that is, be able to 
stack two containers on one car. But the big issue we had other than 
rebuilding and how to rebuild it, was the channel. The channel’s only 36 
feet deep. The Panama Canal is about to be a much, much bigger canal 
and it’s going to take much bigger ships, called post-Panamax ships. And 
we can’t take those. Mobile can’t take those. Houston can, Tampa can. But 
Houston and Tampa both have very constrained capacity, just because 
they’ve run out of land. If you go up the east Coast, Miami and 
185 Ibid., 6. 
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Jacksonville have spent $400 million of state money to deepen their 
channels so they can take these ships. Savannah and Charleston are both in 
the process. We’re not going to get post-Panamax ships, but these 
post-Panamax will come through the Canal and then they will hand off 
cargoes to smaller ships, but ships far larger than the ones we take at 
Gulfport. And the idea was to try and get in the market for those ships. A 
study had been underway before Katrina to deepen the channel but that 
study was interrupted by Katrina. So that was our plan. We’ll get 42 or 45 
feet of channel depth; then we’ll be able to take in bigger ships, but now 
we’ve got to have the port itself where it can take bigger ships.  
The other major consideration was FEMA said, ‘You’re supposed to be 
using the federal money to protect the public.’ And one of the real issues 
in Katrina was the storm surge went across the Port, picked up all these 
containers and bounced them off office buildings, cars, trucks and 
churches -- and containers were swept way into Long Beach. When a 
hurricane comes out of the Gulf, of Mexico, its winds are actually turning 
counterclockwise and so when it hits land, it doesn’t knock stuff north, 
generally; it knocks stuff northwest. It’s like a right cross. And so FEMA 
said, ‘What are you doing to keep that from happening again?’ And one of 
the things we said is, ‘We’re going to elevate the Port. We’re going to 
elevate the port to an elevation that FEMA says is high enough to prevent 
this from happening again’. That turned out to be 25 feet. FEMA approved 
that elevation. That meant we would re-build the Port and when the ships 
would come in, we would have cranes up on that 25 feet pier and they 
would reach out to the ships. It solves one of the problems about having 
bigger ships, but it also achieves the first goal for which the government 
gave us that money: to protect the public, the public’s lives and the 
public’s property. We would be making a real mistake to let Gulfport stay 
the same kind of port that it was. We wanted to change the port from a 
banana port to a port that could service the entire region all the way to 
Chicago.187 
Twelve contracts for engineering, design, and environmental services were 
awarded to companies through several rounds of competitive procurement. In addition to 
these contracts, the port’s 60-acre West Pier fill project elevated the West Pier facilities 
to 25 feet above sea level, which was more than twice the pre-Katrina elevation and about 
three feet above Katrina surge levels.188 Raising the elevation helped provide the port, its 
tenants, and the community with enhanced protection against future storm surges.  
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The port is a major driver of both jobs and business activity and is vital part of the 
comprehensive recovery of the Gulf Coast. The state’s intent in rebuilding this facility 
was not solely to rebuild the facility in a way that better protected the port and Gulfport 
area but also working to build a “Port of the Future” to improve future shipping and 
growth trends. Thousands of jobs were directly or indirectly related to the project. This 
restoration program was important to recapturing a major portion of the region’s job base 
and in filling a national need for more port capacity. With the expected completion of the 
Panama Canal expansion in 2015, ports in the Gulf and southeast must increase their 
operations to handle the nation’s imports and exports. Restoration helped ensure the port 
could service increased traffic resulting from improvements to the Panama Canal.189  
Hurricane Katrina’s winds knocked out the majority of cellular phone towers on 
the coast. Towers that were not destroyed were rendered inoperable due to lack of 
electricity or emergency power generation. Main switched for landline phones were 
destroyed or inundated by the storm surge. For the first week of response operations, 
responders were limited to radios with a range of one to two miles. Communications into 
and out of the impacted area were limited to satellite phones, of which there were few. In 
early September, Nextel Communications, and Southern Linc push-to-talk phones were 
provided in great numbers by the two companies; this greatly enhanced 
communications.190  
The lack of an interoperable communications system severely impeded command 
and control, situational awareness and limited federal, state and local officials’ ability to 
address unsubstantiated and inaccurate media reports.191 After Katrina, Governor 
Barbour was committed to building a statewide, interoperable radio system that would 
withstand a hurricane or earthquake, as Northwest Mississippi is in the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone. In addition, Governor Barbour utilized $280 million in hazard mitigation 
grant money from FEMA to build the system. He had to overcome several obstacles 
imposed by FEMA on using mitigation funds for a communications system. However, he 
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was able to convince Senator Cochran to re-allocate disaster funds for an interoperable 
communications system.  
Governor Barbour’s assessment of Mississippi Wireless Integrated Network 
(MSWIN): 
I said that your boss, Harold Cross at the time of Katrina, that he might 
was well have been a Civil War general. That he could not know what was 
going on in Jackson County without sending somebody over there. I told 
him he could at least send them in a helicopter, he didn’t have to send 
them on a horse anymore, but it’s the same principle. But we couldn’t 
communicate consistently because the cell phone towers were down.  
I testified before the U.S. Senate that the number one thing that the federal 
government could do for us in the mega disaster was to give us survivable, 
interoperable communications among federal, state and local agencies that 
are involved in disasters, whether it’s the military, whether it’s the 
emergency management people, whether it’s the fire department, police 
department, the—the ambulance service, the EMTs—and everybody 
agreed. So we got a very substantial amount of money from the federal 
government and one significant part of it is for what is called ‘hazard 
mitigation’ to try to reduce the chance of future hazards and disasters, or 
to reduce the damage that done by future disasters. Well there is nothing 
better for mitigating risks than communications. So we wanted to spend 
part of that money to build a survivable, interoperable system that is now 
called MSWIN, Mississippi Wireless Integrated Network. 
I think it’s the first in the lower 48. I’m proud of it.192 
In 2007, the Mississippi Wireless Integrated Network (MSWIN) was established. 
Work on the system began in the southern portion of the state, and by 2010 the southern 
third of the state had coverage. The first real test of the network came during the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the summer of 2010. The system performed superlatively 
and linked local, state, and federal entities together. MSWIN consists of over 140 tower 
sites that transmit and receive 700 MHz radio communications along with 6.7 GHz 
microwave connections to nearby towers to backhaul the communication to the closest 
switch. In 2011, Mississippi had a 97 percent coverage rate.193 MSWIN radios are P-25 
192 Haley Barbour, interview with author, August 7, 2014. 
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compliant systems, meaning that they are in accordance with the strictest federal 
requirements for interoperable communications required after 9/11. There are over 
40,000 MSWIN system users, and the system can accommodate over 100,000 daily 
users.194 These users vary from public safety, governmental executive and administrative 
personnel to road maintenance crews. In addition to routine communications, users also 
depend on the network during life threatening conditions and emergencies.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Hurricane Katrina was the costliest disaster to ever strike the United States. 
Tragically, 238 Mississippians perished in the storm. Mistakes were made at every level 
of government. Mississippi is still recovering from the storm, and the recovery will go on 
for many more years. However, the recovery and rebuilding in the state has been a 
systematic, organized, and deliberate process. The population did not leave, the schools 
and homes were rebuilt, and the economy is vibrant. Major manufacturing firms stayed, 
and many more have moved operations to the coast. Governor Barbour led the state 
through the response, recovery, and rebuilding phases. He empowered his team to make 
decisions independently and constantly encouraged them to not be satisfied with the 
status quo. He provided strategic guidance and focused his efforts on getting the federal 
assistance the state needed and deserved. He explains:  
I’ll just close by saying this and I believe this sincerely, I’ve said it in a 
trillion of speeches. You know, our people bore the brunt of the worst 
national disaster in American history, and they got knocked down flat 
because of the utter obliteration. But they did get right back up, hitched up 
their britches and went to work, and they went to work; not just helping 
themselves, but helping their neighbors. I believe Katrina and 
Mississippians’ reaction to Katrina did more to improve the image of 
Mississippi than anything’s that’s happened in my lifetime, and I’m 66 
years old. People looked down here and said, ‘I like what those people are 
doing. They’re trying. They’re not looking for a handout. Those are 
strong, resilient, self-reliant people and I like them.’ And I will tell you: 
More than one time when we were recruiting industries to Mississippi, I 
would have the CEO say, ‘After Katrina, I said to my staff those are the 
kind of people we’d like to have working for us.’ And I think that’s—that 
is the legacy of Katrina, and that is my, to the degree I have a legacy as 
194 Ibid. 
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Governor, it is colored almost entirely by Katrina; just because that event 
was such—so unprecedented it—and it’s—the recovery is still going 
on.195  
For his leadership during Katrina response and recovery, Governor Barbour was 
awarded the Thomas Jefferson Freedom Award in 2006, which is an award presented to a 
nationally recognized leader by the bipartisan American Legislative Exchange Council. 
In addition, he was also named Governor of the Year for 2006 by Washington, DC-based 
Governing magazine. He was also awarded the Gulf Guardian Award by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency for his work to rebuild and protect sensitive coastal 
ecosystems. Additionally, in 2008, Governor Barbour received the Adam Smith Medal 
from Business-Industry Political Action Committee for his pursuit of the principles of 





195 “Haley Barbour, interview with author, August 7, 2014. 
196 Greenblatt, “Steady in a Storm.” 
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V. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
Through interviews and studies of various leaders, Marcus et al. developed the 
theory of meta-leadership, which purports to be a highly effective leadership style in 
today’s complex and fluid decision-making landscape.197 Their theory describes the ideal 
leadership traits that produce optimum success during complex, catastrophic events. This 
chapter will examine Governor Barbour’s decisions through the lens of meta-leadership 
qualities to determine if the theory is applicable to Katrina response operations under 
Governor Barbour’s leadership in Mississippi.  
By design, meta-leadership concept and practice themes address the complexities 
of generating a unity of action when many people, organizational units, and competing 
priorities are focused into a broadly adopted strategy, plan, or mission.198 In concept, it is 
a question of linking problem to solution: what personal and contextual factors affect 
what meta-leaders see, perceive, decide, and ultimately act upon? In practice, it is a 
puzzle of optimally engaging three facets—up, down, and across—of organizational 
connectivity. Who are the many people that must be influenced and how can they best be 
leveraged to prompt forward motion? The meta-leadership model focuses attention and 
helps categorize the scope of people, factors, and considerations that are in the elements 
of this integrated enterprise.199 
Meta-leaders possess a robust array of qualities that they employ to effectively 
assess, manage, and solve problems that occur in day-to-day practices as well as in 
catastrophic events. It is necessary for successful meta-leaders to use all five dimensions 
to be most effective. In examining Governor Barbour’s leadership during and after 
Hurricane Katrina, all five dimensions influenced the actions he took in leading the 
response and recovery for Mississippi. 
197 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 2. 
198 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness,” 131. 
199 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 5. 
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A. THE PERSON OF THE META-LEADER 
Personality, experience, culture, emotional expression, and character are 
significant factors in the conduct and impact of meta-leaders.200 In addition, meta-leaders 
also possess emotional intelligence.201 People who direct large scale or complex 
initiatives must convey these attributes: self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, 
empathy, and social skills. Because they are watched and challenged by audiences 
beyond their usual social and professional circles, meta-leaders must be comfortable in 
their own surroundings, in the milieu of others. Furthermore, they must have the talent to 
make other people feel comfortable and assured. The self-discipline, drive, 
understanding, and capacity to form meaningful and satisfying relationships are critical in 
meta-leaders efforts to cross the usual divides and boundaries of organizational, 
professional and cultural association.202  
Meta-leaders are able to look at problems in a holistic way and use their influence 
in a multifaceted response to arrive at a successful outcome. In addition, meta-leaders 
have the experience and maturity to identify gaps between the problem and the response 
to it. Moreover, they must inspire the connectivity of action and confidence of purpose 
under even the most trying of circumstances. This aptitude for the strategic direction and 
capacity to influence beyond their immediate domain epitomizes the unique contributions 
of meta-leaders. 
Governor Barbour’s experiences leading up to Hurricane Katrina, from high 
school student body president to Chair of the Republican National Committee (RNC) to 
becoming a successful lobbyist, provided him with a wealth of experience from which to 
draw when making decisions for the Mississippi response and recovery to Hurricane 
Katrina. Knowing he was capable of “getting things done” afforded Barbour the self-
confidence to make decisions that were sometimes unpopular. With a strategic plan for 
200 Kirschenbaum, Chaos Organization and Disaster Management, 27. 
201 Burns, Leadership, 17. 
202 Daniel Goleman, Working with Emotional Intelligence (New York: Bantam Books, 1998), 77. 
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the future and the goal for recovery always in mind, he was able to effectively direct 
every facet of the effort at the strategic level. 
Additionally, Governor Barbour fully understood that he must take charge. Early 
in the response, Barbour made it a priority to establish the chain of command. It was 
structured in such a way that empowered local leaders to actively direct the response 
effort of their areas. Barbour recognized that his talents lay not in running the daily, 
tactical operations associated with the storm response, but rather at the strategic level 
working with federal officials to acquire the necessary resources, namely funding. In 
addition, he took many risks, especially in the first few days after the storm. He also 
strongly urged both volunteers and responders not already in the impacted region not to 
deploy until the search and rescue was completed and the roads were cleared. He knew 
that this was a prudent action, but he also realized that he could have been criticized by 
the media and general public if responders had in fact needed more assets. Furthermore, 
Barbour accelerated the reestablishment of a local workforce by deciding to refuse an 
extension for unemployment funds for residents. While Ingalls Shipyard and other 
businesses were operational and there were employment opportunities for coastal 
residents, people were choosing not to work and received unemployment benefits. This 
strategy, while seemingly harsh, actually encouraged productivity. 
Barbour knew what Mississippians feared most concerning hurricanes: another 
storm as destructive as Hurricane Camille in 1969. He was able to leverage that fear to 
persuade the coastal population to evacuate by convincing the media to compare the two 
storms. He also knew that self-preparation was essential and convinced both his cabinet 
and the public to be prepared.  
Throughout the response, Barbour embodied the person of the meta-leader. The 
meta-leader has the experience and maturity to identify gaps between the problem and the 
response to it and then to inspire the connectivity of action and confidence of purpose 
under even the most trying of circumstances. This aptitude for the strategic direction and 
capacity to influence beyond his immediate domain epitomizes the unique contributions 
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of the meta-leader. Barbour’s personality, character, emotional intelligence and self-
disciple closely mirror a meta-leader as described by Marcus et al.203 
B. THE SITUATION 
The greater the complexity the more difficult it is to develop a factual, evidence-
based clear, and actionable description of what is occurring.204 To understand the 
complexities of the situation is to grasp the disparities between what one believes to be 
true and the actual truth.205 Situational awareness and the ability to identify and thus 
close gaps in information are key traits of the meta-leader. In a complex situation, the 
many stakeholders involved naturally have their own analysis and interpretation of the 
“objective problem” in accordance with their distinct interests, concerns, and 
purposes.206 
Meta-leaders cannot suffer from “paralysis by analysis.” A quick assessment that 
is mostly accurate is better than a slow, thorough one that that comes too late to make a 
difference.207 Because of this, meta-leaders also calculate the upsides of those decisions 
and actions, again understanding that “success” will be measured differently by each 
stakeholder who is affected.208  
In a complex, catastrophic event, a decision maker’s primary challenge is to 
develop a clear picture of what is happening as a whole. The decision maker must discern 
the most accurate data in the midst of an ocean of information in a constantly changing 
environment. Using sense-making and the development of “connectivity between 
disparate views,” leaders with situational awareness can direct response-team members to 
a meaningful and productive course of action.  
203 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 9.  
204 Bransford, and Stein, The Ideal Problem Solver, 32. 
205 Marques, “Awakened Leadership in Action,” 813. 
206 Nicholls, “Meta Leadership in Organisations,” 18. 
207 Weick, Making Sense of the Organization, 53. 
208 Nicholls, “Meta Leadership in Organisations,” 19. 
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As soon as he was first notified of the imminent landfall of Hurricane Katrina, 
Governor Barbour made decisions that affected Mississippians before, during and after 
the storm. He drew upon historical knowledge of past hurricanes and relied upon the 
expertise of subject matter experts to advise him on the best plan for surviving the storm.  
Barbour knew what Mississippians feared most concerning hurricanes: another 
storm as destructive as Hurricane Camille in 1969. He was able to leverage that fear to 
persuade the coastal population to evacuate by convincing the media to compare the two 
storms. By leveraging his personal relationship with U.S. Senator Trent Lott, a 
homeowner in Pascagoula, to prepare his home for the impending storm, Barbour was 
able to impress upon coastal residents the importance of taking ownership for their safety. 
He knew that self-preparation was essential and convinced both his cabinet and the public 
to be prepared.  
In addition, Barbour knew that the people needed to know the truth in a clear, 
fully transparent manner. His press conferences, press releases, and speeches left nothing 
to the imagination as far as the damage to the southern portion of the state. In his 
presentations, he was adamant that this was a Mississippi disaster that would be solved 
by Mississippians. 
Barbour was adept at considering and using all assets available to address 
problems that arose. Hurricane Katrina effectively rendered all roads impassable and 
therefore isolating survivors from relief efforts. Barbour leveraged the assets he had in 
the National Guard to fly helicopters to remote areas to identify and assist stranded 
residents. This was never in the hurricane plan, but it was an operation that ultimately 
saved lives.  
By discerning the key elements needed to reestablish the destroyed communities, 
he worked to develop the simple but effective recovery plan of rebuilding schools, jobs, 
and infrastructure. Barbour understood that coastal residents, if given the opportunity to 
re-locate to other states, would not be inclined to return to the coast if too much time 
passed. Additionally, he knew that once children were settled into new routines at new 
schools, families would become comfortable in new homes and when the bread winners 
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established new relationships with new employers, the chances of returning to the coast 
were slim. For these reasons, Barbour focused much of his time and energy in getting 
businesses opened, the schools rebuilt, and establishing temporary housing. Barbour 
knew what was needed to keep residents on the coast, and he was largely successful in 
building the infrastructure to keep them. By 2008, net job losses were only 3,000 and the 
coastal population was only 12,000 less than before the storm.209 According to the 2010 
U.S. Census Bureau census, the three coastal counties had a population growth of 2.4 
percent over the 2000 census.210 The ability to get all affected schools open before the 
beginning of November 2005 was an unprecedented accomplishment. Barbour’s 
understanding of the value of getting coastal children back in school in order to keep their 
parents on the coast and contributing to the economy and recovery was one of his the 
single greatest accomplishments. Barbour knew that the second order effect of not getting 
schools opened was the large-scale abandonment of the coast by the middle class.  
Barbour’s relationship with business owners and his sense of urgency in getting 
factories, offices and retail stores opened were critical. He needed to get people back to 
work but also needed to begin creating a tax base for the cities and counties.  
Barbour related the three times in the state’s history that a catastrophic event had 
occurred: the Civil War, the Flood of 1927, and Hurricane Camille. He knew that the 
state had suffered for many years after each of those events because of the lack of vision 
in how to rebuild. Moreover, Barbour understood the opportunity Katrina provided to 
rebuild the way the residents wanted the coast rebuilt. Additionally, Barbour formulated a 
plan and articulated that plan to his cabinet and to the people; Barbour did not wait until 
the full scope of the destruction was known. He took the basic information and 
immediately began formulating his concept for recovery and rebuilding.  
There is little doubt that the actions taken by Barbour in the immediate aftermath 
of the storm and his decisions for the months following represented a complete 
understanding of the situation and the opportunities to make the coast a better place than 
209 Mississippi Gulf Coast Business Council, Mississippi Gulf Coast 3.0. 
210 United States Census Bureau, “State and Country Quick Facts,” July 8, 2014, accessed November 
17, 2014, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html 
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before the storm. Marcus et al.’s description211 of understanding the situation by a meta-
leader correlates precisely with Governor Barbour’s decisions and actions in the 
aftermath of Katrina. 
C. LEAD THE SILO 
In complex environments involving multiple organizations, departments, and 
units operating in overlapping domains, leaders who arise as meta-leaders rarely operate 
independently. They have their own organizational base of operations within which 
followers see them in charge.212 It is imperative that, in order to get people outside of the 
organization to follow meta-leaders, their own people must support them as leaders who 
are looking out for their organization’s best interests as well as the totality of the 
situation. For meta-leaders, the support of their constituents is essential to achieving 
influence within the larger system. 
Leadership does not reside with one person. In robust organizations, it is 
embedded among many people and at multiple levels of the hierarchy.213 Effective 
leadership is a continuous learning process. Therefore, meta-leaders must constantly 
encourage subordinates to learn, grow, and have vision. These goals must continuously 
be modified as the situation dictates. Meta-leaders understand the way relations at the 
highest levels affect operations at the lowest level. They use this understanding in a 
positive, proactive manner to enhance morale and shared purpose throughout the 
organization.214 
Governor Barbour fostered an environment of teamwork in each of his endeavors. 
His cabinet, local, and county officials and the Mississippi Legislature all became part of 
a unified team with common goals. Barbour had been governor of Mississippi for over 
two years prior to Hurricane Katrina. He had established himself as the leader of the state 
of Mississippi early in his term and ensured all who worked for him knew that he was in 
211 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 17.   
212 Ibid., 12. 
213 Giuliani, and Kurson, Leadership, 56. 
214 Ibid. 
77 
                                                 
charge. In addition, he fostered a productive work environment for his staff and state 
agencies, believing people should do their job and if a problem arose, it could be fixed. 
This environment enabled key staff members and state agency chiefs to be confident in 
being a part of the solution process when decisions were made in the response and 
recovery of Mississippi after Katrina. His guidance to his cabinet in the early days of his 
administration was “If you think you know what to do, do it. Don’t come ask me when 
you think you know what to do. If you think you know what to do, do it. And if you 
screw up, we’ll clean up.”215 Governor Barbour believed in delegating both 
responsibility and authority. Furthermore, he led his administration by providing vision 
and guidance and then allowing his subordinates to develop strategies within their 
organizations.  
The Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal was the 
perfect vehicle to develop and implement the plan to bring the coast back from utter 
destruction. The Commission formed for rebuilding was the ideal entity to ensure that all 
followers had a voice and the opportunity to express their desires for recovery and 
rebuilding. By forming the Commission and appointing Jim Barksdale, the former CEO 
of Netscape, as the director, Barbour successfully brought together disparate entities into 
a single, unified body in which to collaborate on rebuilding the coast. His decision to 
implement a Unified Command Post with MEMA and FEMA also ensured that there was 
a shared purpose in the emergency management community.  
The devastation from Katrina was so severe that key leaders had no idea where or 
how to begin the response. They understood the gravity of the situation, but what they 
needed was a meta-leader to step in and provide guidance, or at least a starting point. 
Barbour’s guidance to key leaders provided the spark to take action. Furthermore, he 
provided the kind of direction that unified the effort. The relationships developed by 
Barbour were both horizontal and vertical. Barbour instilled his vision of what the coast 
could become and his constituents and cabinet members easily adopted this vision and 
developed their strategies accordingly. True meta-leaders foster innovative thinking that 
215 Haley Barbour, interview with author, August 7, 2014. 
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expounds upon the leaders’ vision. This leadership trait was prevalent in Barbour’s 
guidance throughout the response. 
D. LEAD UP 
Great meta-leaders are great subordinates. They are dependable, honest, reliable, 
and loyal. In addition, they validate the power and command equation and respect and 
serve the objectives of those in charge. In this way, meta-leaders craft vertical 
connectivity and foster two-way feedback. Influence is shaped by informing and 
educating the boss, and the ability to effectively influence the boss is an important 
element of wider leadership within the system. In government, as well as in corporate 
settings, subject matter experts often report to elected or appointed authorities who are 
responsible for policy direction and strategic decision making. While subordinates may 
not know more than their boss, they often have a perspective on the work at hand that 
their boss does not. Because they are in closer proximity to that work, subordinates have 
a better sense for both real problems on the ground as well as solutions to address them. 
This perspective and functional interdependence could be a valuable asset to the boss, 
though much depends on how the information is delivered and how it is received.216 In a 
successful boss-subordinate relationship, meta-leaders are able to fashion wide influence 
throughout the system by virtue of the support and opportunities the boss is able to open. 
As an elected governor, the people of Mississippi were first and foremost 
Barbour’s “boss.” Despite short-term pressure for immediate actions, Barbour hinged his 
rebuilding plan on enhancing the future quality of life of those impacted by the storm. 
Barbour realized that many of his initiatives should be long-term, often at the expense of 
short-term, instant gratification projects. He was criticized for allocating over $570 
million in Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funding to the Port of 
Gulfport; however, Barbour knew that the future of the port was in expanding its capacity 
and raising the port’s elevation to 25 feet above sea level. The long-term growth from the 
port expansion would bring in more jobs and commerce than any other initiative. The 
second order effects of the port expansion also including significant upgrades to the rail 
216 Ibid., 18. 
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system throughout the state and the entire Midwest all the way to Chicago. While 
accountable to the citizens and the federal government, Barbour effectively influenced 
the wider leadership with regards to executing CDBG funding. He believed that the 
greater good was in the long-term development of coastal infrastructure.  
Barbour knew more about Mississippi’s needs than did the leadership in 
Washington, DC. While Congress controlled the funding for the Katrina rebuilding 
efforts, Barbour effectively influenced the Mississippi congressional delegation on how 
the funding should be prioritized. He repeatedly emphasized that rebuilding was a 
Mississippi effort and the final decisions should be up to the locals, not their Washington 
representatives or federal officials. Effective meta-leaders practice “truth to power.” They 
anticipate and manage unforeseen problems and develop solutions before they occur. 
Governor Barbour was highly successful in his strategies for leading up and being as 
good a subordinate as he was boss. Furthermore, he was a skilled negotiator and 
consistently successful in gaining concurrence from those he served, both in Mississippi 
and in Washington, DC. He did not make demands of Congress; rather, he convinced 
Congress that the most successful path was the path to self-sufficiency and a return to 
self-governance that would restore the coast much faster than it would have if Congress 
was simply providing public assistance in lieu of work, schools and housing.  
Governor Barbour’s and Dr. Bounds’ presentation to congressional members and 
Department of Education officials was a perfect example of Barbour’s acumen at 
consensus building across the spectrum of government.217 The U.S. Department of 
Education had no real plan for how to handle the loss of so many schools. Therefore, the 
short-term approach to fund the new school districts over the destroyed ones seemed 
logical. Barbour’s proposal was seen for the exceptional plan it was: to keep the students 
in their own communities and allocate funding immediately to rebuild destroyed and 
damaged schools. This consensus building served to get the money where it was needed 
immediately and ultimately saved the taxpayers millions in the destroyed and damaged 
schools would have still been rebuilt, albeit at a later date.  
217 Bounds, Report on Mississippi’s Schools, 6. 
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In addition to answering to the people of Mississippi, Governor Barbour also 
worked for the President of the United States. With the influx of aide to the state, Barbour 
had to say “no” to well-meaning but misdirected assistance. Mississippi’s hurricane 
response plan was not adequate to support such a large event, and neither was the federal 
government’s. The proposal for General Honore to assume command of the entire 
military response may have seemed logical given the size and scope of the disaster but 
Barbour knew that this would take the response authority away from Mississippians. 
Barbour was able to stick to the plan and assert his authority over the Mississippi 
response while not alienating National Command Authority.  
E. LEAD CONNECTIVITY 
In building a wide sphere of influence, meta-leaders grasp that just as vertical 
linkages are important, so too are horizontal linkages. By leveraging the capacity of many 
adjacent centers of expertise and capacity, meta-leaders are able to engage the spectrum 
of agencies and private interests recruited for a shared enterprise.218 The ability to 
generate a common, multi-dimensional thread of interests and involvement among 
entities that look at a problem from very different yet complementary vantage points is a 
defining trait of meta-leaders. By combining assets and efforts, meta-leaders envision and 
activate more than what any one entity could do on its own. This collaboration may 
require some traditionally competitive constituencies to turn away from well entrenched 
attitudes about and behaviors toward one another. 
Governor Barbour did not wait for the federal government to come to the rescue. 
When it was apparent that resources provided by FEMA were lacking, he used other 
avenues for obtaining critical commodities. He leveraged his personal relationships with 
business owners in the state to provide resources and leveraged his military contacts to 
provide commodities from strategic war stockpiles. Barbour’s immediate goal was to 
ensure the affected population had life-sustaining commodities. 
The relationships in Washington, DC that Barbour had cultivated over decades 
proved invaluable. His ability to work directly with President Bush, key members of 
218 Ashkenas, The Boundaryless Organization, 65. 
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Congress and other federal organizations eliminated the normal bureaucracy. He was able 
to go directly to the key decision makers because he was well-known and respected 
throughout the Capital.  
Barbour was skilled at generating a common, multi-dimensional thread of 
interests and involvement among entities that looked at a problem from very different yet 
complementary vantage points. Nowhere was this more evident than in the collaboration 
across the entire rebuilding effort than the housing, schools, and jobs vision. Barbour 
effectively convinced all entities that all three of these areas were intricately connected 
and could not be mutually exclusive thus requiring the cooperation and “buy in” from the 
U.S. Department of Education, Housing and Urban Development, FEMA, Department of 
Labor, and a whole host of other agencies.  
Barbour not only exerted his influence at the national level, he exerted his 
influence at consensus building across all state agencies in his vision of getting schools 
opened, temporary housing and jobs. In addition, he created a shared enterprise that made 
this vision a single entity instead of three separate and distinct initiatives. By doing so, he 
created a linkage that compelled state officials to consider the holistic rebuilding 
approach.  
In the reestablishment of businesses shortly after the storm, Barbour focused on 
the refinery, the shipyard, and businesses such as Oreck that were willing to meet the 
challenges of becoming operational with little or no infrastructure. He knew that the key 
to getting Mississippians back to work was having places for them to work. Additionally, 
he convinced business owners to open as soon as possible even if the infrastructure was 
not completely rebuilt. This put workers back into a productive mode months earlier than 
had the businesses waited until full repairs were made. Barbour was able to convince 
these owners that getting people back to work was crucial to keeping those workers on 
the coast. His success was evidenced by the number of businesses that provided housing, 




Governor Barbour’s decisions and actions during Katrina juxtaposed to the 
theories of meta-leadership epitomize Marcus et al.’s concept of leadership during a 
catastrophic event.219 Meta-leaders are capable of projecting their scope of thinking, 
influence, and accomplishment far beyond formal or expected bounds of authority. Meta-
leaders generate widespread and cohesive action and impact that expands their domain of 
influence and leverage. Nowhere is this concept more apparent than Governor Barbour’s 
leadership during Hurricane Katrina. Marcus et al. defined meta-leadership and 
developed the theory from examining leadership traits of many persons in leadership 
positions. What they did not do is apply this theory to one person during a single, 
catastrophic event. Barbour displayed all of the traits of meta-leadership throughout the 
response to Katrina and in the years following when the coast was rebuilding. The 
Mississippi Gulf Coast is better now than it was in 2005, prior to Katrina. There are more 
jobs, more homes, tourism is generating more revenues than ever, and major industries 
are expanding and moving to the coast. There can be little debate that the success of the 
coastal rebuilding was due to Governor Barbour’s leadership and vision. This leadership 
and vision are precisely the traits described by Marcus et al.220 and serve as a sterling 
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Chain of Command x x x x x 
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Commodity 
Distribution x x x x x 
Communicating with 
the Populace x x x x x 
Formation of the 










Jobs x x x x x 
Schools x x x x x 
Homes x x x x x 
Rebuilding 
Infrastructure x x x x x 
Port x x x x x 
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VI. DRAWING CONCLUSIONS: META-LEADERSHIP AS A 
MODEL FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS DURING LARGE-SCALE 
DISASTERS 
A. IMPORTANCE OF GOOD LEADERSHIP 
Organizations use leadership frameworks to articulate what is expected of their 
leaders in order to drive success. In order to be meaningful, such frameworks need to be 
reflective of the organization’s cultural DNA and give people a clear sense of how they 
can achieve its strategic goals.221 The benefit of having such models in place is that they 
provide clarity, consistency, and a common language for identifying, assessing, and 
developing leaders 
A successful leadership framework is forward-looking and inspirational. It is also 
relevant to the present and grounded in the past. In addition, it is pragmatic and exciting 
at the same time; it is comprehensive yet memorable. Additionally, it is clear to everyone 
how it ties in with the organization’s strategy and purpose and provides a roadmap to 
achieve the leader’s vision and goals. A successful leadership framework describes the 
capabilities and behaviors that are needed to drive the success and are easy to assess. It is 
congruent with and complements the organization’s values. Not only is it simple, 
compelling, and user-friendly, it uses language that resonates with the organization. It is 
distinctive and unique to the organization. Finally, a successful and inclusive framework 
should put more emphasis on outputs and the impact that leaders need to have on the task 
at hand and should not be too prescriptive.222 
B. GOVERNOR BARBOUR AS A META-LEADER 
Governor Haley Barbour’s leadership during Hurricane Katrina was nothing short 
of outstanding. The Gulf Coast of Mississippi emerged from the devastation of Katrina as 
a more vibrant and economically sound region than it was before the storm. Business and 
industry returned as did the population. The 2010 census data revealed that the population 
221 Gardner, On Leadership, 37. 
222 Ibid., 40. 
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of the coastal region was larger than before the storm.223 Revenues from the casino 
industry exceeded its revenues from before the storm. What is more, shipbuilding 
continues to be the largest in the nation and the school districts are some of the best in the 
state and students’ test scores exceed the national average. Also, homes have been rebuilt 
and lives restored. By any measure, the coast has more than recovered from Katrina; it 
has emerged from the storm better and more productive than before the events of August 
29, 2005. 
Barbour built consensus. He rallied the people of Mississippi to rise to the 
challenge of overcoming the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. He did so by using his 
down-to-earth, “good ole boy” mannerisms and by using such colloquialisms as “hitch 
ourselves up by our bootstraps and get to work.” He convinced the people of the state 
that, while it was a dire situation, recovery was possible. Moreover, he saw the big 
picture and served as an inspiration to the entire state. Finally, he was not afraid to make 
mistakes, and he was not afraid to admit it when he was wrong. These are the traits of the 
person of the meta-leader. 
Barbour immediately saw the gravity of the situation; yet, he was able to make 
sense of conflicting information and made sound decisions without all of the information. 
In addition, he understood the gap between objective reality and subjective assessment 
and was able to formulate a vision and a plan to move forward. He did not suffer 
“paralysis by analysis;” rather, his situational awareness allowed him to develop cohesive 
priorities and to take risks. Barbour was able to function in a volatile, uncertain, complex 
and ambiguous environment without folding to the pressure. These actions epitomize the 
situation tenet of meta-leadership. 
There can be no doubt that Barbour led his silo. Not only did he build a team that 
had great experience and worked well together, he defined his expectations and allowed 
his cabinet to make their own decisions without fear of micro-management or retribution 
for honest mistakes. Moreover, he considered loyalty to be paramount, both given and 
received. He drove the learning curve and encouraged his people to continuously learn.  
223 “United States Census Bureau,” State and Country Quick Fact, July 8, 2014, Mississippi, accessed 
November 17, 2014, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html  
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Barbour knew who his bosses were; they were first and foremost his constituents, 
and he treated them with respect and loyalty. His actions always took into account the 
greater good for the people. Not only that, Barbour displayed humility during his press 
conferences and transparently communicated with Mississippians concerning the 
damage, the future plans and what was expected of the residents, volunteers and 
responders. He also knew he was accountable to Congress, the president, and to the 
taxpayers of the country who were financing the recovery of his state. Barbour’s actions 
personified the fourth tenet of meta-leadership in every way. 
Finally, Barbour created cross-system connectivity in everything he did. He was 
quite adept at consensus building between state and federal agencies. For example, he 
generated a common, multi-dimensional thread of interests that involved the entire 
response community, from FEMA to the U.S. Department of Education to HUD and their 
corresponding state agencies. He not only created the links necessary to reduce 
bureaucracy in order to facilitate response and recovery, he was a master at getting all 
parties involved to share values, aspirations, and objectives. These were the requirements 
defined by Marcus et al. for the final tenet of meta-leadership.224 
Why meta-leadership as a model for leading? Many actions taken by Governor 
Barbour can be applied to the five tenets of model of Marcus et al.225 Prior to my 
interview with Governor Barbour in August 2014, he had never heard of meta-leadership, 
much less ascribed to the tenets. So why call him a meta-leader if he was not 
intentionally following the model? Portraying Governor Barbour as a meta-leader 
provides an actual case study to apply to the theory. This gives credence to the theory and 
creates an opportunity to further study this model and apply the traits, beliefs, and values 
of other leaders to the meta-leader construct. Leaders can now take this model out of the 
classroom and into the world of complex problems. Meta-leadership is about people and 
relationship building. Subscribing to the tenets of meta-leadership during the team 
building process of an elected official’s term can serve to negate many of the personality-
driven issues in the aftermath of a large-scale event.   
224 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 38.  
225 Ibid., 37.  
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C. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE THEORY OF META-LEADERSHIP 
Leadership models are only as good as the application of the theories to reality. 
Meta-leadership is a theory, based on a composite analysis created in an academic 
environment. So why look at meta-leadership as “the next best thing?” The world is 
changing. Supply chain management, instantaneous global communications and real-time 
news reporting have virtually negated most of the old, hierarchal leadership models. 
Modern leaders must acknowledge that today’s innovations can make complex situations 
even more complex. The days of “leader leading follower” in a uni-dimensional construct 
are gone. New leadership paradigms are a must if responses to catastrophic events are to 
be judged as successful. The model of meta-leadership needs to be re-examined and 
modified in order to be applicable to leaders in catastrophic events.  
Marcus et al. state clearly that the person of the meta-leader is important. They 
describe the person of the meta-leader as a “big thinker,” one who is willing to take a 
large and complex problem and search a wide expanse for solutions.226 A meta-leader is 
capable of seeing the bigger picture. Marcus et al. do not discuss how a leader or elected 
official becomes the person of the meta-leader. The only realistic way for an elected 
official to become a leader is through prior experience. The only way for a leader to 
become a meta-leader is through a great deal of experience combined with intelligence 
and initiative.  
Governor Barbour displayed leadership traits dating back to his days at Yazoo 
City High School where he was the valedictorian and class president. Barbour’s skills at 
politics were well-developed during his days at the RNC. He knew how to get to the key 
decision makers in Congress through his experiences as both the Chairman of the RNC 
and as a lobbyist. Had Barbour not brought 30 years of experience with him into his two 
terms as governor, would the decisions he made in the aftermath of Katrina been as 
good? Barbour understood that the response, recovery, and rebuilding should have been 
done by Mississippians. This was the defining decision for the state’s re-emergence from 
the storm better than it was before. However, it was Barbour’s knowledge of the inner 
226 Ibid., 6. 
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workings of the nation’s capital that secured the billions in funding to rebuild the state. 
This knowledge was based on experience. The meta-leadership model should include 
experience as a key portion of the Person tenet. Future research into the theory of meta-
leadership should examine the role of experience to further determine how prior 
experience impacts the overall decision-making process of the leader. If a leader lacks 
experience, the model must dictate how a leader surrounds himself with key subordinates 
with proven records of experience in their areas of expertise. Furthermore, the leader 
must acknowledge that experience in order to mitigate his lack thereof.  
In the situation tenet, Marcus et al. assert that the meta-leader must develop a 
factual, evidenced-based, clear, and actionable description of what is happening.227 This 
situational awareness must be done in a time-constrained environment. Marcus et al. do 
not emphasize that the need to expeditiously gain situational awareness is critical. Time is 
the one area that a leader never has enough of. Governor Barbour understood the need to 
immediately develop a long-term solution. His vison for homes, schools, jobs was 
articulated three days after the storm.228 Barbour recognized that his vision would be 
modified as the response and recovery phases progressed, but the fundamentals of his 
objectives never changed. Marcus et al.’s model must better articulate the necessity for 
making rapid, accurate decisions while acknowledging the constraints of time and that 
the meta-leaders must develop a strategic plan in the early stages of a disaster. The near-
term, tactical response should be left to first responders. Meta-leaders need to not only 
see the big picture but also develop the plan for actions that will occur months and years 
from the time of the decision. Essentially, the model of meta-leadership must articulate 
that the biggest enemy of the leader is time. Making good, rational decisions at the onset 
of response dictates future success.  
The other three tenets of meta-leadership are well articulated and serve as an 
excellent template for leaders responding to catastrophic events. Leading a silo, being a 
good subordinate, and building cross connectivity are common sense methodologies. 
227 Ibid., 9. 
228 Haley Barbour, interview with author, August 7, 2014. 
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Marcus et al. provide a good analytical framework for these last three tenets.229 These 
themes can be taught.  
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
The homeland security enterprise has a plethora of systems, policies, procedures, 
rules, and regulations. The National Threat Advisory System is designed to warn the 
public of imminent terrorist attacks. Public laws dictate how funds can be spent. Billions 
have been spent on the acquisition of computer networks, bullet-proof vests, armored 
vehicles, and other items to protect the nation from terrorism. Millions have been spent 
on teaching the Incident Command System to local law enforcement officers, volunteer 
firefighters and emergency managers. And yet every time there is a large-scale event, 
from the Boston Marathon Bombings to Hurricane Sandy, the overarching sentiment is 
that there was a gross failure of leadership to identify the threat, stop the threat, or 
respond to the aftermath of an attack or natural disaster. Clearly, there needs to be an 
emphasis on leadership to the “left of the boom.” Leadership is the art of caring about the 
relationship between people and their organizations, and it is about team-building and 
strategizing. Leadership is about imagination. It is incumbent on leaders to imagine what 
the worst case scenario can be and then to articulate that in such a manner that 
subordinates understand the threat and can then develop a plan to mitigate the threat, be it 
terrorism, natural disasters or man-made events. The meta-leadership theory provides a 
template for leaders in Homeland Security to utilize. Meta-leadership facilitates multi-
dimensional decision making through collaboration. Meta-leadership is not a panacea for 
all situations encountered by homeland security leadership. However, it does provide a 
foundation for leaders in homeland security to focus on in order to hone their skills at 
leading or governing their organizations to achieve success.  
In FEMA’s after action report from Hurricane Sandy, four themes were addressed 
that were deemed essential to the whole of community construct endorsed by the 2011 
National Preparedness Goals: 
1. Ensuring unity of effort across the federal response; 
229 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 6.  
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2. Being survivor-centric; 
3. Fostering unity of effort across the whole of community; and 
4. Developing an agile, professional emergency management workforce.230 
FEMA addressed areas for improvement in each of these themes. These 
recommended improvements deal with cross-organizational collaboration at the senior 
leader level. However, there is no mention of how these changes can be implemented. 
The only way to fully implement changes that facilitate cross-organizational 
collaboration is for FEMA to adopt a leadership model to train its leadership to emulate 
in large-scale events. Meta-leadership represents an ideal model to use or to at least 
examine as a prospective model for future events. The tenets of meta-leadership 
synchronize with the National Preparedness Goals that promote collaboration at senior 
governmental levels.  
The meta-leadership model is being taught. For example, the Meta-Leadership 
Summit for Preparedness Initiative evolved after 9/11. The Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) Foundation, working with CDC, reached out to Marcus et al. to teach meta-
leadership to government and business leaders. To date, the CDC Foundation has hosted 
36 leadership summits and instructed over 5,000 leaders on the concept of meta-
leadership.231  
In 2007, the Homeland Security Advisory Council released its Report of the 
Homeland Security Culture Task Force. The report recommended that DHS adopt a 
leadership and training model, including joint duty and training that would help all of 
DHS leadership focus collaboratively on key leadership expectations and objectives.232 
However, the report’s leadership model did not define the leadership process or provide a 
roadmap for DHS leaders to follow. Rather, the model merely listed outcomes desired to 
affect a positive leadership environment (see Figure 2). At no point does DHS provide a 
230 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Sandy: FEMA After-action Report 
(Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013), 3. 
231 “Meta-Leadership Summit Resource Center,” CDC Foundation, April 2011, Instructional 
Seminars, accessed November 25, 2014, http://www.cdcfoundation.org/meta-leadership 
232 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Report of the Homeland Security Culture Task Force 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2007), 3. 
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leadership model that describes how to be a leader. This thesis’s research question asks, 
“Can this model be replicated by other leaders?” Given that there is no formal training on 
leadership models by DHS, this question cannot be answered. With no formal 
curriculum, it would be up to individual leaders to attempt to learn the tenets of meta-
leadership. It is an imperative that DHS develop a training curriculum that trains 
leadership models. Meta-leadership provides an excellent model for leading in a 
complex, catastrophic environment. Marcus et al. have a training regimen designed to 
instruct senior governmental and business leaders.233 This program of instruction should 
be implemented by DHS across the entire homeland security enterprise. 
 
Figure 2.  DHS Leadership Model234 
233 “Meta-Leadership Summit Resource Center,” CDC Foundation, April 2011, accessed November 
25, 2014, http://www.cdcfoundation.org/meta-leadership  
234 Ibi Homeland Security Advisory Council, Report of the Homeland Security Culture Task Force, 5. 
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E. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Leading is a process, a way of doing things, a way of moving people and 
organizations in a direction that results in success. The process requires cognitive 
knowledge, experience, and action. Leadership is both an art and a science. Marcus et al. 
developed their theory based on interviews and observations of hundreds of leaders.235 
While this model defines the critical traits needed to become a meta-leader, it does so by 
extrapolating only the good qualities from the leaders studied. This creates the sense that 
there can be a “bionic” meta-leader in which positive traits are built upon and negative 
traits are removed or ignored. Future research must focus more on case study analyses of 
individual leaders and how their actions, both positive and negative, influenced the 
outcome. Furthermore, future research must determine what style of leadership was 
applied during a disaster. With meta-leadership currently being taught, future research 
must examine whether leaders in a disaster situation received meta-leadership training.  
The complexities of leadership in today’s environment are obscured by the focus 
of traditional theories on leadership as the top-down, leader-subordinate construct typical 
of hierarchical organizations. During the course of their research, Marcus et al. found 
that approximately 85 percent of the existing leadership literature assumed a hierarchical 
leadership structure.236 Additionally, they discovered that many leadership theories dealt 
with a single level of process because it is difficult to develop multi-level theory. A single 
level process does not integrate all disciplines of response operations or the behavior of 
individuals, groups, or organizations as a whole. Leaders must catalyze action well above 
and beyond their formal lines of decision making and control. With the advent of 
outsourcing business functions, real time supply chain management, whole-of-
government constructs and real-time information flow, the traditional notions of 
hierarchal leadership require modifications to keep pace with changing technology and 
governance structures.  
235 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National Emergency Preparedness,” 131.  
236 Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, “The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership,” 3. 
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Governor Barbour’s smart practices fit each tenet of meta-leadership. The 
decisions he made, from revising the state’s initial hurricane plan to his “jobs, schools, 
homes” initiative displayed a strategic, collaborative vision to expedite Mississippi’s 
recovery from Hurricane Katrina. To effectively prove that meta-leadership provides a 
sterling example of leadership in catastrophic events, more case study analyses need to be 
conducted. A case study of Louisiana’s response compared to Mississippi’s response to 
Katrina would be a logical future research project. Furthermore, a comparison of New 
York’s and New Jersey’s response to Hurricane Sandy could further determine the 
validity of the meta-leader theory. To further the refinement of this leadership theory, 
researcher such as Marcus et al. should become involved in the examination of individual 
leaders and their actions during specific events rather than compiling a listing of 
leadership traits using numerous leaders and numerous events.  
A single case study does not validate a leadership model. However, this case 
study proves that the theory of meta-leadership can be applied to a large catastrophe as 
envisioned by Marcus et al.237 Given that there is no current leadership model for leaders 
in homeland security or for elected officials, the theory of meta-leadership warrants 
consideration. Future research is imperative, but it is my hope that this study provides a 
reasonable foundation to continue the examination of meta-leadership. There is no doubt 
that Hurricane Katrina wreaked havoc on not only the Gulf Coast but also on the 
American public’s confidence in leadership at the state and national levels. By embracing 
a leadership model, it is conceivable that DHS could begin a program of teaching meta-
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